Hungary’s new energy plan quietly redefines Russia as a risk

Hungary’s updated draft of the National Energy and Climate Plan (NEKT) strikes a noticeably different tone from the government’s earlier narrative about Russian energy imports. 

While official communications in recent years described Russian gas and oil as a given – even as the “guarantee of cheap energy prices” – the new ministry document explicitly defines the country’s dependence as a risk that must be reduced.

The revised plan, first reported by Economx after appearing on the Ministry of Energy’s website, states that Hungary’s energy supply remains heavily dependent on Russian imports, particularly in the case of oil, natural gas, and nuclear fuel.

According to the document, the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has highlighted that the risks stemming from this dependence must now be addressed “with a broader set of tools”, since previous supply models no longer provide sufficient security.

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“Not only Hungary’s, but the region’s interest as well”

The ministry’s text contains unusually direct language for an official Hungarian document. One key passage reads:

“Because of the country’s regional role in oil product distribution, managing the risks stemming from import dependence and diversifying oil supply – thereby reducing exposure to the dominant supplier, currently the Russian partner – is not only in Hungary’s interest, but in the region’s as well.”

Such a sentence could easily appear in an EU energy strategy paper – yet it comes from a Hungarian government document. In previous years, government communications emphasised the necessity of Russian imports. As recently as this autumn, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó warned that Hungary’s energy security would be “destroyed” without Russian oil and gas.

Earlier this week, Szijjártó announced that the government would use “all political and legal means” to block a new EU proposal aimed at banning Russian energy imports. He argued that the European Commission “has no idea what consequences such a move would have” for countries such as Hungary or Slovakia, and claimed the package would “kill energy security”.

The ministry’s plan, however, adopts a markedly different tone. It frames the reduction of dependence not as a political question, but as a strategic necessity.

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Russian energy would remain – but as a risk

While the European Union is preparing to phase out all Russian oil and gas imports by 2028, the Hungarian ministry’s draft proposes a more gradual timeline. By 2030, the goal is to reduce Hungary’s import dependence to 80 per cent for natural gas and 85 per cent for oil – not a full withdrawal, but a partial and progressive decoupling. This slower approach is broadly consistent with the government’s long-standing rhetoric, which prioritises security of supply over abrupt change.

The plan identifies several tools to achieve this: reducing gas consumption, improving energy efficiency, and diversifying import routes and suppliers – in other words, ensuring that Hungary no longer relies solely on Russia for its energy needs.

It also highlights new or expanded infrastructure projects such as the Krk LNG terminal in Croatia, connections to Italian and Slovenian networks, and a planned new Serbian–Hungarian oil pipeline.

The text, therefore, does not break with the government’s broader energy policy, but its phrasing aligns more closely than before with the EU’s strategic direction on Russian energy.

The real novelty lies in the language itself. Unusually for a Hungarian government document, Russian import dependence is formally defined as a risk. That wording alone signals a subtle but significant shift beneath the surface of political rhetoric.

A cautious step, not a full turn

The draft undoubtedly reflects a more pragmatic approach than in previous years, but offers few details about practical implementation. The government appears to be balancing two priorities: maintaining its existing ties with Moscow while meeting EU expectations for diversification.

As such, the document reads less like a radical policy shift and more like a measured adaptation to a changing geopolitical landscape – a cautious adjustment rather than a clean break.