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EU awaits Hungarian election before punching Putin in the face with a new ban, FM Szijjártó claims
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Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó underscored energy supply challenges at a conference organised by the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MKIK) on Tuesday. He also talked about an EU plan concerning Russian crude and the Hungarian election.
EU will not introduce new ban until election outcome is known
Szijjártó noted the impact of the conflict in the Middle East on global oil supply and said the situation for Europe was exacerbated by the political decision to phase out Russian crude imports. He said decision-makers in Brussels could roll back that measure, on the basis of “economic rationality“, but added that would run counter to their plans to table a full ban on imports of Russian crude on April 15, three days after Hungary’s election.
If the current government remains in power, Szijjártó said it would fight against the ban on Russian crude, adding that Hungary’s access to that cheap Urals oil was key to keeping household utilities bills affordable.
Hungary’s government has managed crises in the past 15 years by adopting its own measures, rather than “standardised” European-level policies, and has emerged the better for it, he said.
“Sovereign decision-making must be maintained, regardless of which dilemma may come. For us, a Hungarian answer must be delivered, based on the national interest,” he added.
The state should function as a catalyst for innovation
Szijjártó also pointed to the success of the government’s policy of economic neutrality, allowing it to attract large volumes of FDI.
“Hundreds of thousands of jobs have been created thanks to our decision not to hinder cooperation between companies from the East and the West with artificial ideological barriers,” he added.
MKIK chairman Elek Nagy told the conference that the state should function as a “catalyst for innovation” in future and said the system of support should shift to innovation and R+D.
He acknowledged the success of the extensive growth of Hungary’s economy over the past 15 years, but pointed to the need to boost efficiency in the export sector. Hungary is on the cusp of the middle-income trap and needs to change its approach to focus on a knowledge- and technology-based economy, he added.
If you missed our previous articles concerning the European Union:
- Zelenskyy sets timeframe to restart Druzhba oil pipeline to Hungary
- Hungary calls on EU to lift Russian oil sanctions after US eases restrictions
Does he ever sleep? Presumably, his preferred media outlets and journalists must work in shifts. More of the same isn’t necessarily better. Eventually, people get tired of listening and tune out.
I do like the euphemism of “conflict in the Middle East” when there is usually the “Peace!”, “No War!” mantra, “WW3!” scaremongering and “Warmonger!” finger pointing when Ukraine is involved.
What is a Politician to do when your BFFs Mr. Trump and Mr. Netanyahu start a war of choice and tip the world into turmoil?
And @karlmay – from experience, I can tell you Mr. Szijjártó is extraordinarily fit, energetic and driven. Doesn’t make him a pleasant person, though.
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If anyone has an opportunity to punch wanted war criminal Putin in the face please do it. Take that barbaric animal out.
Does the Hungarian Foreign Minister even know the current economic situation in Russia? Preventing new sanctions by Hungary is the least of the problems, something that could be ignored if it were the only one.
https://www.dw.com/ru/vlasti-rf-sokrasaut-budzet-rost-cen-na-neft-ne-spasaet/a-76401132
Russian authorities are cutting the budget because rising oil prices are not saving the day!
The year 2026 began not so long ago, and the Russian authorities are already preparing to cut budget expenditures. At first it was only rumors, but then the information was confirmed by the Ministry of Finance – and revealed some details. Predictably, it was decided not to touch the expenses related to the conduct of the war in Ukraine. Why the Russian budget is not coming together despite another tax increase and rising oil prices caused by the war in the Middle East – in the material DW.
In the first two months of 2026, the federal budget deficit amounted to 3.45 trillion rubles (1.5% of GDP) – against the annual plan of 3.79 trillion (1.6% of GDP). This is a record value for the beginning of the year.
Oil and gas revenues amounted to Br826 billion – more than Br300 billion less than the planned level. Compared to the same period of 2025, they have decreased by almost 50%.
All the assumptions laid down in the budget turned out to be wrong. According to the government’s forecast, on the basis of which it was made, a barrel of Urals oil this year should have cost an average of 59 dollars. However, in January for the calculation of oil and gas taxes it was necessary to take 41 dollars per barrel (this was the average price in December 2025), in February – 44.6 dollars. At the same time, the ruble turned out to be too strong. The budget is based on 92 rubles per dollar, while in practice the exchange rate was 77.6 rubles in January and 76.9 in February.
Non-oil and gas revenues are growing. To increase revenues, the government has once again raised taxes – in particular, revised the VAT rate. But so far the growth has been restrained – only by 4.1%, up to Br3.94 trillion. If the dynamics does not accelerate, it may not be possible to fulfill the annual plan of Br31.4 trillion, experts of the Gaidar Institute say. On the one hand, the VAT increase will start to be translated into revenues only from the second quarter – now the budget revenues are at the previous rate. On the other hand, the collections may not reach the plan due to the ongoing economic slowdown, which threatens to turn into a recession.
In the meantime, expenditures at the beginning of the year grew ahead of schedule. In the first two months, they added 5.8% year-on-year, although the government’s plan was to grow by only 2.9%.
The U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran was an unexpected gift to the Russian economic authorities. Oil prices rose sharply because of the threat of blocking the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow sea corridor through which the Persian Gulf countries export oil to the world market.
The price of a barrel of Brent rose from $70 to more than $100. The price of a barrel of Russia’s Urals crude, which is close to Middle East crude, approached $80 by the end of the second week of the war, according to Argus Media data cited by Bloomberg. Some deals were made at nearly $100.
In March, oil and gas revenues for the Russian budget will still be modest – taxes will be calculated based on the low February price ($44.6 a barrel). In April, according to Reuters calculations, if prices remain at the current level until the end of March, the Russian budget will be able to receive about 590 billion rubles. What will happen next is unknown.
“Russia’s energy revenues fell sharply at the beginning of the year due to the tightening of sanctions and because of logistical restrictions affecting export volumes, so even with the current rise in oil prices, it will probably take several months of sustained high prices to at least compensate for the losses for January – February,” says Isaac Levy, an expert at the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), in a comment to DW.
Minfin has so far confirmed only the fact of future spending cuts. The media report on its size, citing informed sources. According to Reuters and Vedomosti, the Finance Ministry initially notified the ministries of the prospect of cutting “all” expenditures, but then it began to discuss cutting only “insensitive” ones – by 10%.
The so-called “protected” items of expenditures will probably not be cut, economist Dmitry Polevoy writes in his Telegram channel. These include spending on defense (Br13 trillion), national security and law enforcement (Br4 trillion), social policy (Br7 trillion) and public debt servicing (Br3.9 trillion).
In addition, according to the economist, the so-called public regulatory obligations (these are, in particular, pensions and benefits) in the amount of about Br1.5 trillion, as well as inter-budget transfers (money, which the federal budget transfers to the regions) in the amount of Br9 trillion, will not go under the knife.
All these items add up to about Br38 trillion. In total, the government planned to spend just over Br44 trillion in 2026. As a result, about Br6 trillion worth of expenditures will be cut. In this case, the government can save about Br600 billion – if we are really talking about 10%, concludes Polevoy.
But there are other estimates. Experts of the Gaidar Institute believe that we may be talking about Br1-2 trillion. A similar estimate – about Br1.5 trillion – is given by former Russian Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Aleksashenko. Bloomberg also estimates the maximum size of the sequester at Br2 trillion.
However, experts believe that “economic” expenditure items will be cut first of all. These are, for example, various national projects (their implementation may be postponed or extended in time), investments in infrastructure and road construction. In other words, economic development will have to be sacrificed in order to preserve the bloated military expenditures.
Mr. Szijjártó only speaks with Mr. Lavrov, and I am sure he only hears good things!
Seriously though – being an ordinary citizen in Russia must suck, at the moment. Hearing some proper horror stories from those who live abroad. For those stuck – better get used to hardship. The good old days, for some.
It seems to be getting increasingly difficult to keep the lid on the pot in Russia.
Blogger, former member of the Russian Public Chamber, lawyer Ilya Remeslo, previously known primarily for his denunciations of Alexei Navalny, published a series of posts in Telegram on March 17 and 18 sharply criticizing Putin. Among other things, Remeslo criticized the war in Ukraine and called for Putin to be tried, calling him an “illegitimate president.” In the videos he recorded and in a conversation with “Agency”, Remeslo confirmed that he is the author of the texts and that they reflect his current views.
Remeslo’s post, published Tuesday evening, in which he listed five reasons why he “stopped supporting Putin,” caused the most outcry. Among them are the war in Ukraine, the stranglehold on the internet and media freedom, corruption and damage to Russia’s economy from Putin’s actions, and the irremovability of power. “Vladimir Putin should resign and be put on trial as a war criminal and thief,” Remeslo concludes. In a post published later, he also wrote about Putin’s “palaces” and his “craving for luxury.”
In a conversation with “Agency,” the blogger emphasized that he is in Russia and has no intention of leaving, although he realizes that he may face prosecution. He also predicted Putin’s loss of power this year if he does not heed criticism of him. According to Remeslo, his statement will show Putin.
Ilya Remeslo gained fame in the late 2010s as the author of information campaigns with attempts to discredit opposition activist Alexei Navalny. The Insider journalists found out that they were coordinated with the Presidential Administration.
My God, in Russia lies become truth and truth degenerates into lies. I know from personal experience that employees like to flatter the boss to make themselves look good, but a good boss knows this and forms their own opinion. That’s only possible, however, if you’re sober.
ISW: Gerasimov Lies To Putin All The Time – Analysts explained the reason why.
General Valery Gerasimov continues to exaggerate tactical details and overstate Russia’s successes on the battlefield, creating the false impression that the front line in Ukraine is on the verge of collapse.
On March 16, Gerasimov visited the command of Russia’s Southern Group of Forces and claimed that Russian troops captured 12 settlements in Ukraine in the first two weeks of March 2026 (roughly March 1-14). But the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) specifies that Russian forces captured two settlements in the first two weeks of March 2026.
Valery Gerasimov exaggerated Russia’s claimed successes in small villages along the front line in an attempt to portray these successes as significant and convince the West and Ukraine to concede to Russia’s territorial demands.
He fictionalized that Russian troops had captured Drobyshevo, Yarovoye, Sosnovoye, Reznikovka, Kaleniki and Golubovka in the Donetsk region, as well as Veselyanka in the Zaporizhzhya region.
ISW recorded that the Russians operated in 24 percent of Drobyshevo, 50 percent of Yarovoye and 57 percent of Reznikovka, and did not enter the other settlements at all.
Gerasimov repeated his December 29 statement that Russian forces controlled more than half of the town of Liman in Donetsk region, but presented it as fresh information, probably to give the false impression that the Russian army was rapidly advancing on the front.
The ISW estimated that the Ukrainian Defense Forces had probably liberated previously Russian-controlled parts of Liman.
The chief of the Russian General Staff also claimed that the Russian army controlled more than 60 percent of Konstantinovka, although according to the ISW, the occupiers were only operating in 7.85 percent of the city.
Gerasimov also tried to downplay Ukraine’s successes in eastern Zaporizhzhya region, claiming that Russian troops were maintaining the initiative, actively advancing and repelling all Ukrainian counterattacks.
But the AFU reportedly liberated more than 400 square kilometers in the Alexandrovsky and Gulyaipol directions between late January 2026 and mid-March 2026.
Gerasimov, in particular, has made similar claims, exaggerating alleged successes on the battlefield in mid-January and February 2026. He holds similar rallies on a monthly basis.
Gerasimov has also claimed that Russian forces continue to expand the “buffer zone” in Sumy and Kharkiv regions, and has claimed to have captured a number of settlements, but ISW emphasizes that Russian forces are conducting limited cross-border attacks on small villages in order to make an informational impact and convince the West that the front line in Ukraine is crumbling and that Ukraine must give in to all Russian demands.
The front line in Ukraine is, in fact, operationally stable, and Ukraine has liberated more territory than Russian forces captured in the theater of operations in February 2026.
Orban and his ilk should be advised not to listen only to Putin, because otherwise they might be in for a rude awakening.