“From stick to spoke”: can Tisza reset relations with the EU and not betray its voters?

Ahead of Hungary’s parliamentary elections, the Tisza Party, according to its published platform, proposes a radical shift in foreign policy. The plan is built on contrast with the current government’s policies. Budapest, according to the party’s chief diplomat Anita Orbán, must cease to be a “stick in the wheel” of the European Union and become a “spoke” in a functioning system. However, behind the ambitious promises to restore Brussels’ trust and unlock frozen funds lies a series of contradictions and risks that cast doubt on the success of any future reforms.

Tisza’s primary foreign policy goal is to return Hungary to the club of the EU’s privileged partners. The party’s manifesto is filled with pledges to restore the rule of law and democratic norms, which would automatically unlock access to billions of euros from European funds. Yet the details of these reforms are vague, and the means of their implementation are unspecified.

The key problem lies not in Tisza’s willingness to negotiate, but in political reality. Even if it secures a majority and the prime minister’s office, the party will face formidable resistance from political opponents. Any new government would have to seek compromises, which will inevitably limit its room for maneuver. In this context, following the experience with Poland, Brussels will demand hard guarantees, not merely a shift in foreign policy rhetoric.

Despite its pro-Western orientation, Tisza professes a commitment to defending national sovereignty. The party states it is ready to advocate for Hungary’s interests within alliances, not against them. At the same time, the political force aims to access frozen EU funds, the fate of which will be decided based on decisions that are highly unpopular domestically.

Migration policy will remain the most sensitive area. Tisza promises to maintain the border fence and firmly oppose migrant quotas. However, the rhetoric of “border protection” will inevitably clash with EU legal obligations. Unlike the Orbán government, which tended to ignore European norms and pay fines, Tisza would likely return to the negotiating table. Experts fear that the outcome of these negotiations may not fully align with national interests: concessions to Brussels would be the unavoidable price for financial solidarity.

One of the most notable shifts would be an attempt to restore the Warsaw-Budapest axis, which fractured after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. For Tisza, rebuilding trust with Poland is not merely a symbolic gesture, but a necessary condition for revitalizing the Visegrád Four as a significant political forum.

A similar approach is planned towards Hungary’s neighbors. Tisza intends to channel disputes regarding ethnic Hungarians into a diplomatic framework. This concerns both the conflict with Slovakia over the Benes decrees and the protracted issue of minority rights in Ukraine’s Transcarpathia. However, achieving progress will be extremely difficult, as Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico is unlikely to make concessions to Hungarian opposition figures, and the Ukrainian question remains a toxic subject.

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Here, Tisza will be compelled to make tangible compromises. The party will likely lift its veto on support for Ukraine. Although Tisza members rule out arms supplies, financial aid and the removal of obstacles to Kyiv’s European integration will become part of Budapest’s new agenda.

Tisza’s platform presents itself as a comprehensive answer to voter demands: it is substantial, addresses acute issues, and offers immediate solutions. However, observers largely agree that at this stage, it remains an election manifesto rather than an actionable plan.

The project’s critical vulnerability lies in personnel. The task of executing this reset will fall to individuals with no prior experience in state governance. The political vacuum that would emerge if the Orbán administration departs would be filled by novices. Under these circumstances, even the most pro-European program risks being left in a bottom drawer, and its failure would become Brussels’ most painful disappointment in Eastern Europe in recent years.

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