As it has been reported in the media, the European Council of Member States’ heads of government agreed on the multiannual financial framework last week but, just a few days later, the extraordinary meeting of the European Parliament adopted a resolution with a two-thirds majority and rejected the agreement, voicing several critical remarks.

Since the agreement cannot enter into effect without the approval of the EP as a co-legislator, the German presidency will need to put a serious effort this autumn into harmonizing Member State interests with the concerns of the Members of European Parliament.

In addition to the budget related debates, there is another area where the German presidency will also need to meet some high expectations: the agreement to regulate the details of the UK’s exit from the Union and the future EU-UK relations. 

This does not look like a simple task either, especially if you consider the deadline (31 December, 2020) and the diverse interests of the Member States. 

I am not going to discuss every detail of the Brexit deal here, and while the trade, energy, fishing and agriculture chapters will undoubtedly have a major impact on future EU-UK relations, I am only going to focus on the European security and defence details of the deal. This is the area where I believe the EU will suffer highly significant losses after the exit of the United Kingdom.

The UK is one of the few key geopolitical players of Europe: it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council; it has the largest defence budget of all Member States; it is one of the few NATO members that actually meet the NATO guideline to spend 2% of its GDP on defence; and, besides France, it is the only country that has all the military and defence capabilities, including nuclear capabilities as well.

This means that Europe loses its member with the strongest defence capabilities, and at the worst possible time, too.

Brexit is taking place at the time of a geopolitical turning point when Russia is returning to the international arena while testing the limits of international law; China induces a strategic competition with the West; and the USA, the power that has guaranteed Europe’s security since the Second World War, has lately been plucking at the strings of unilateralism by terminating international agreements and spectacularly pulling out of international institutions. 

In this geopolitical situation, the next decades will most likely be characterized by instability, tensions in trade, technological race, terrorism and global security challenges. 

These are the areas were the EU and the UK will be increasingly dependant upon each other. Both negotiating parties will need to make each other understand that the UK is leaving the European Union, but not Europe. Great Britain has indisputably had an ambivalent relationship with our continent ever since the reign of Henry VIII, and the Common Security and Defence Policy defined in Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) has never fully won the approval of the British but both parties are still aware that they are bound together by their shared civilizational values as well as their historical and geographical characteristics. 

That is why they must be able to demonstrate unity and strategic solidarity in security and defence issues, regardless of what happens in the other areas after their separation.