Iran, a vast and diverse nation in the Middle East, is characterized by its large ethnic and linguistic minorities.
Approximately half of the country’s population comprises non-Persian ethnic groups. Among these groups, Azerbaijani Turks and Kurds stand out as the second and third-largest ethnic communities in Iran, respectively. Turks predominantly inhabit the northwest, particularly the four provinces (Ardabil, Zanjan, East, and West Azerbaijan) collectively known as Iranian Azerbaijan, while Kurds primarily reside in the western regions of the country. However, beneath this cultural diversity lie simmering tensions exacerbated by a myriad of socioeconomic, environmental, and political factors. Economic difficulties, regional disparities, environmental issues, and human rights abuses have all contributed to the emergence of complexities in ethnic relations and inter-ethnic conflict in Iran in recent years.
Being the most populous minority in the country and adhering predominantly to Shia Islam, which is the official religion of the Islamic Republic, Azerbaijani Turks are mainly viewed as the most well-integrated non-Persian community in Iran. However, linking this integration success only to religion is a simplistic view, since the historical background of the Turks’ attitude toward Iranian identity provides us with valuable insights. Iran has gained its modern-day identity and societal structure through the establishment of the Safavid Empire, which made Shiism the state religion and converted the majority of the population residing there to this confession. Back then, Iran used to be the ‘scientific center’ for Sunnism, the most widespread sect of Islam, which was changed by the Safavids seeking to generate a common idea to support their reign through generations, on which they were decisively successful. Although Safavids and other dynasties following them were usually labeled as the Persian Empire by Western academia due to the fact that Iran was historically called Persia, the founding elite of those empires (Safavid, Afsharid, and Qajar) had mainly consisted of Azerbaijani-Turkish nomadic tribes. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the Safavid Empire was founded in Iranian Azerbaijan, more exact to say, in Ardabil. Besides, for a quite long time (till the Pahlavi era), Tabriz (center of Iranian Azerbaijan) was considered the second capital of the empire, if not the actual capital in the early 16th century, and had nicknames such as Valiahdneshin (residence of Qajar Crown Prince), and City of Firsts, for the pioneering role of the city during the early modernization of Iran.
While this special place Turks enjoyed ceased after the enthronement of Reza Shah Pahlavi, and his and his son’s pursuit of Persian nationalism by discriminating and trying to assimilate the minorities, it is enough for the majority of this community to feel as the major element of the Iranian society partaking in the very foundation of the Iranian state. Active participation of Iranian Azerbaijani regions in the Islamic Revolution and the following Iran-Iraq war (Ardabil had the second-highest rate of fallen soldiers only behind Isfahan) strengthened these invisible ties. This makes the research of the discrimination against Turks in Iran more challenging, since the center-periphery dichotomy between Persian and minority-inhabited provinces gets obscure. Nevertheless, it is not so hard to detect the explicitly discriminatory practices against Turks, such as the lack of education in the mother tongue, pejorative stereotypes among Persians, persecution of activists, careless reaction of the government toward the ecological crises happening in Iranian Azerbaijan (the situation with Lake Urmia is the most obvious example), rising poverty hitting Turks and other minorities unequally, and so on. The policies aimed at the assimilation of Azerbaijani Turks, firstly introduced by Pahlavis, aren’t lifted totally, and Azerbaijani Turkish continues to be treated as a second-level language with no use in state institutions. Not only the ethnic topics, but also the worsening economic situation, which in turn forces people to migrate to bigger, mostly Persian-dominated cities, where minorities tend to be Persianized after one or two generations, are quite threatening for Turks and this threat makes them behave more cautiously about preserving their ethnic identity. That’s why Iranian Azerbaijan is viewed as the ‘last bastion of Turkish identity,’ where Persianization policies couldn’t succeed. Although the main power threatening Turkish identity here appears to be the central government dictating Persian, the increase in the number of Kurds, mostly due to natural growth or economic migration, can sometimes be understood as the most imminent ‘attack to the Azerbaijani bastion’. This conflict of interests between Turks and Kurds occur mainly in West Azerbaijan province, where the majority consists of Turks with a sizable Kurdish minority residing mainly in mountainous areas close to the border, but the same tendency can be observed in East Azerbaijan and Ardabil, too, although to a much lesser extent.
As one of the largest minority groups in the country, Kurds residing in Iran have endured prolonged and systematic discrimination. Their access to social, political, and cultural rights has been severely curtailed, along with their economic opportunities. Regions predominantly inhabited by Kurds have been neglected in terms of economic development, leading to widespread poverty. Evictions and demolitions of Kurdish homes have further exacerbated housing insecurity among the community. Additionally, authorities restrict parents from giving their babies Kurdish names, while efforts to incorporate the Kurdish language into education face continuous obstacles. Religious minority groups also face targeted measures aimed at marginalizing them, with Sunni Kurds facing particularly acute discrimination. A discriminatory selection process known as the “gozinesh” system imposes allegiance to Islam and to the Islamic Republic as a prerequisite for employment and political engagement, and is also used to discriminate against minority groups, such as Kurds, from equal participation in these spheres. Despite limited concessions such as occasional use of the Kurdish language in media and respect for certain aspects of Kurdish culture like traditional attire and music, activists advocating for Kurdish rights often face heightened persecution when they tie their advocacy to their ethnic identity. Kurdish individuals involved in human rights activism, community organizing, and journalism are frequently subject to arbitrary arrests and legal prosecution. Others endure torture, unfair trials in Revolutionary Courts, and even death sentences. These systematic violations not only suppress Kurdish voices but also reinforce their socio-economic marginalization within Iranian society.
The economic challenges faced by both Turks and Kurds play a significant role in exacerbating tensions between these communities. As a result of these economic difficulties, many Kurds are compelled to migrate from their impoverished rural homelands to urban centers, including Turkish-majority cities such as Urmia, Tabriz, and Ardabil, in search of better economic opportunities. This influx of Kurdish migrants into Azeri-majority areas has sparked tensions, as local Turks perceive them as economic competitors and resent their growing presence. The government of Iran has exploited these tensions for its own political ends, particularly in regions where Azerbaijani Turks and Kurds coexist, such as West Azerbaijan. By exacerbating divisions between these ethnic groups, the government seeks to consolidate its power and deepen mistrust and animosity between Turks and Kurds. Lack of control over Kurdish militant groups and higher firearm ownership (despite being illegal) among Kurds, on the one hand, and prioritizing Azerbaijani Turks over Kurds when recruiting civil servants and officers due to religious reasons (since Turks are mainly Shia), escalate the existing tensions and put it in a systematic, state-orchestrated way.
While finding a sustainable reconciliation formula for the conflicts between the ethnic groups that have coexisted for centuries is never easy, focusing more on common struggles like assimilation policies and persecution led by the central government might be the correct way for both Kurds and Turks to proceed. Segmentation can be the biggest obstacle hindering a unified response to the repressive government. This might be partially explained by the trend of self-alienation among Kurdish political circles from the common Iranian opposition by primarily pursuing Kurdish interests instead of cooperating with other oppositionists. The latest example of this phenomenon was the March 1 elections in Iran, where, for the first time in history, more Kurdish delegates were elected in West Azerbaijan than Turkish ones (7 to 5), largely due to the active participation of Kurds in the election, and in contrast, a boycott campaign among Turks like other Iranians. This kind of attitude might paralyze the Iranian opposition, as Kurds are a significant portion of it.
