Op-ed: Why Israel might strike Iran again — and what it really seeks to achieve

The recent 12-day war between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) marked a major turning point in the evolving security order of the Middle East. Many regional analysts describe it as a “war for survival”—an identity-driven conflict framed as a zero-sum game, where one side’s victory implies the other’s destruction. Although the two adversaries are now observing a “fragile truce“, it resembles more an “armed peace” than genuine stability. Mounting evidence suggests that Israel is preparing another round of attacks on Iran, even after Washington claimed to have neutralised Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure. This raises an important question: why would Israel seek to strike Iran again if the nuclear threat has been contained?

To address this question, two widely held assumptions need reexamination. First, that Iran is inevitably on the path to acquiring a nuclear weapon. Second, that Israel’s attacks have been preemptive strikes aimed at preventing such an outcome.

For years, both Western and Iranian analysts have insisted that Tehran possesses the technical capacity to build a bomb and is merely months away from doing so. This narrative gained momentum after Iranian officials announced 60 percent uranium enrichment. Kamal Kharrazi, an advisor to Ali Khamenei, claimed in June 2022 that: “In just a few days, we increased the uranium enrichment level from 20% to 60%, and it can easily be increased to 90%. Yet none have convincingly explained why Iran has refrained from crossing the threshold—whether due to technical limitations or fear of sanctions.

The reality lies elsewhere: Moscow’s strategic veto. Russia, not Washington, is the primary external constraint on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Moscow has consistently opposed a nuclear-armed Iran, partly because of its close coordination with Israel and partly due to its unwillingness to tolerate another nuclear power within its regional sphere of influence. Tehran has long used its “nuclear threshold” status as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the West, not as an immediate path to weaponisation. In other words, the nuclear issue has been a diplomatic instrument, not a genuine military objective.

Iran’s foreign policy has long been shaped by exigency—a lack of viable alternatives—leading to an overreliance on Moscow and Beijing. Tehran viewed Russia as a strategic ally capable of providing political, military, and diplomatic protection against the United States. Yet, for Moscow, Iran was always a tactical partner, not a strategic one. Russia’s refusal to veto UN sanctions for two decades and its reported intelligence coordination with Israel in Syria both illustrate this reality.

According to several former IRGC commanders, Israeli airstrikes in Syria were often facilitated by Russian intelligence. More recently, Mohammad Sadr, a member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council, alleged that Russia even shared intelligence with Israel during the 12-day war. In this light, Iran’s failure to develop a nuclear weapon was never about fear of Western retaliation—it was about Moscow’s red lines.

Therefore, if Iran does not possess a nuclear bomb and its nuclear sites have already been destroyed, what then motivates Tel Aviv’s renewed aggression?

The answer lies in identity, deterrence, and hegemony. For decades, Israel and the Islamic Republic have defined each other as an “existential threat“. Their rivalry transcends conventional deterrence and has evolved into what might be described as omni-balancing—a state of perpetual confrontation across political, ideological, and military dimensions.

The latest Israeli attack targeted missile launchers, air bases, and conventional military infrastructure, not nuclear facilities. However, even this explanation is incomplete. Israel also struck non-threatening targets—including Red Crescent helicopters and helicopters used against border insurgents, basic training camps, and oil refineries. This suggests that Israel’s objective extended far beyond self-defence. This pattern indicates that Israel’s true concern lies with Iran’s growing missile capabilities and its potential to project power (hegemony) across the region.

At home, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces deep political and judicial crises. For him, continued conflict with Iran represents both a unifying distraction and a shield against domestic accountability. No country changes its political leaders in wartime; Netanyahu knows this better than anyone. Yet the broader motivation is geopolitical. Israel’s attacks on Iran are not merely acts of preemption—they are steps toward regional dominance and the consolidation of Israel’s role as the Middle East’s security anchor.

By defeating or degrading Iranian capabilities, Israel seeks to demonstrate that it can single-handedly manage regional security, reinforce deterrence, and signal to both Washington and Arab capitals that it remains the indispensable power. This is as much about global optics as it is about battlefield realities. Israel’s message is clear: it cannot be destroyed, and it alone has the capacity to reshape the Middle East’s security architecture.

While it is difficult to determine who “won” the 12-day war, Israel appears to have gained the upper hand in the information and perception domain. Tehran’s actions—especially its activation of the trigger mechanism and its reliance on military deterrence alone—have weakened its position. By defining deterrence purely in military terms, Iran neglected the importance of economic and societal resilience.

The regime’s failure to engage its own population as a strategic asset has created a dangerous internal fragility. The scale of emigration underscores this point: between 7 and 10 million Iranians now live abroad, a figure roughly equal to Israel’s total population. This internal erosion amplifies Iran’s strategic isolation—especially as China and Russia withhold meaningful support.

Many in the region suspect that the 7 October attacks served as a convenient pretext for Israel to advance preplanned objectives. It strains belief that Israel’s intelligence services, among the most sophisticated in the world, were caught entirely off guard. By leveraging the crisis, Israel has been able to justify escalatory military action, consolidate domestic unity, and reshape regional alliances under the banner of counterterrorism. The resulting war has fundamentally altered the regional balance, isolating Tehran even further.

Now, feeling abandoned by its eastern partners and encircled by hostile neighbours, Iran may reconsider its nuclear restraint as the only credible path to deterrence. Israel, acutely aware of this possibility, is thus preparing for another strike—one that, according to Israeli officials, will be far more devastating and decisive than before.

In conclusion, the Middle East is entering a volatile new phase, where deterrence, perception, and power projection are rapidly converging. Israel’s calculus is no longer about survival—it is about shaping the post-war regional order. Whether Tel Aviv’s next offensive achieves this goal or triggers wider instability remains to be seen.

What is certain is that the shadow war between Israel and Iran has entered a new, unpredictable chapter—and the region is once again on the brink of transformation. If Israel strikes again, it won’t just be testing Iran’s defences — it will be testing the viability of deterrence in a region where U.S. dominance is fading.

Written by: Behrouz Ayaz

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