Changing economic and trans-Atlantic conditions have led to power restructuring in the 27-nation European Union, opening doors for more negotiating power for many smaller central and former Eastern European nations such as Hungary.
Author: Peyman Pejman
Analysts and observers interviewed believe the EU power structure has moved from a few more powerful EU countries setting the agenda to smaller states forming coalitions of their own and pushing their agenda upward to the European Commission, represented by heads of state.
“There always was this kind of Franco-German engine internally leading the European integration and cooperation to move things forward, but I would say they are weaker than before,” says Martin Kovalek, executive director of the Prague-based nonprofit think tank EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy.
Professor Pamela Cotte at Prague’s Charles University agrees. “The EU was founded (in the aftermath of World War II) so there would never be a war between France and Germany again. The idea was to put together the industrial capacity of Germany and France so there would never be a major war in Europe again.”
That power structure was often added to with Italy and the United Kingdom, but the world –and European—scene has changed.
“I would say I have noticed that the relationship (at the top European level) has not been as strong in the past five years. One of the reasons is the general economic tensions since COVID because it has made countries focus more on their own internal affairs and not overall EU issues or foreign policy,” she adds.
Economic philosophy has always been at the heart of Franco-German relations.
“Germany is considered a frugal state, so in the past it has been looking for balanced books, with support from Scandinavian countries and Austria, whereas France surrounded itself with southern European states such as Italy and Spain on this topic of economy,” says Marie Krpata, a Research Fellow specializing on Franco-German relations at the French Institute of International Relations.
The two countries eventually agreed on creating a 700 billion euro fund to help member states cope with the pandemic.
Since the pandemic, Germany and France have gone through substantial domestic changes that have created opportunities for other member states.
“There is a new dynamic (in Germany) with the Ukraine war. Germany realized it energy dependence on Russia and decoupled from it. But it is still dependent on the US from the defence and security perspective, which is increasingly becoming a problem with Europe distancing itself (from the US0 and it is also aware of its dependence on China when it comes to economy, so the whole German model is reshaping in light of these dependencies,” says IFRI’s Krpata.
French President Emanuel Macron, in his last year in office, is equally dogged by a fragmented political system that has hampered to bring a French mandate to the European Union.
For its part, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, while in power longer than many of her predecessors, is also weaker than she used to be. The United Kingdom, once a major power broker in the EU, is no longer a member, though it continues to play an important part.
Those weaknesses and internal restructuring have given rise to a new model of brokership in the union.
“More and more, countries are developing coalitions not just on regional issues but also broader, international topics,” says EUROPEUM’s Kovalev.
“For example, in the Czech Republic, it is not just looking at (neighboring) Slovakia but also looking at opportunities with the Netherlands, which is far away but might have the same political priorities, or reaching out to Canada or even Australia,” he adds.
Hungary, once feared and despised because of policies of former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, is now counted on as a new unifying factor, a “game player” which has already played its card by approving a large economic aid to Ukraine, which Orbán had held up.
In return, the European Commission is working with Budapest to release as much of the 10 billion Euros in upheld recovery funds before the deadline expires in August.
Still, the European Commission and the European Union are expected to use the power of the purse when it comes to “democratic backsliding,” with countries such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic using populist and at times pro-Russia policies to undermine democratic rule in their states.
Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Italy were still the biggest net contributors to the EU budget in 2023, with Germany by far the biggest donor.
“We are having strong tendencies for democratic backsliding in the old socialist member states – Hungary, Poland, somewhat in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,” Cotte says. The real danger, she and others say, is that if some of those countries use their policies in support of autocratic rulers such as US President Donald Trump or Russian President Vladimir Putin, those countries would gain a bigger foothold in Europe, as they did when Orbán was in power.
Would experts recommend the EU using the money leverage as hammer?
“Countries might be unhappy, but there is a financial incentive to go along,” says Cotte. At the same time, she adds, “Withholding money can backfire. As the Iran war continues, there is a good chance of prices rising even more and, without economic incentives, it could add to Euro-scepticism.”
“The EU states need to really listen to why people are moving toward these extreme parties. Governments need to take measures that protect people, such as in energy prices. And the EU needs to reform itself. It also needs to work on its messaging. It is not good at showing people the good things it does for its people. The extremist/populist/nationalist parties seem to be much better at this, even if many of their policies do not actually help ordinary citizens,” adds Cotte.
If you missed it: New foreign policy plan in Hungary: a return of an Austro–Hungarian alliance?
