Op-ed: Why Israel might strike Iran again — and what it really seeks to achieve

The recent 12-day war between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) marked a major turning point in the evolving security order of the Middle East. Many regional analysts describe it as a “war for survival”—an identity-driven conflict framed as a zero-sum game, where one side’s victory implies the other’s destruction. Although the two adversaries are now observing a “fragile truce“, it resembles more an “armed peace” than genuine stability. Mounting evidence suggests that Israel is preparing another round of attacks on Iran, even after Washington claimed to have neutralised Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure. This raises an important question: why would Israel seek to strike Iran again if the nuclear threat has been contained?

To address this question, two widely held assumptions need reexamination. First, that Iran is inevitably on the path to acquiring a nuclear weapon. Second, that Israel’s attacks have been preemptive strikes aimed at preventing such an outcome.

For years, both Western and Iranian analysts have insisted that Tehran possesses the technical capacity to build a bomb and is merely months away from doing so. This narrative gained momentum after Iranian officials announced 60 percent uranium enrichment. Kamal Kharrazi, an advisor to Ali Khamenei, claimed in June 2022 that: “In just a few days, we increased the uranium enrichment level from 20% to 60%, and it can easily be increased to 90%. Yet none have convincingly explained why Iran has refrained from crossing the threshold—whether due to technical limitations or fear of sanctions.

The reality lies elsewhere: Moscow’s strategic veto. Russia, not Washington, is the primary external constraint on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Moscow has consistently opposed a nuclear-armed Iran, partly because of its close coordination with Israel and partly due to its unwillingness to tolerate another nuclear power within its regional sphere of influence. Tehran has long used its “nuclear threshold” status as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the West, not as an immediate path to weaponisation. In other words, the nuclear issue has been a diplomatic instrument, not a genuine military objective.

Iran’s foreign policy has long been shaped by exigency—a lack of viable alternatives—leading to an overreliance on Moscow and Beijing. Tehran viewed Russia as a strategic ally capable of providing political, military, and diplomatic protection against the United States. Yet, for Moscow, Iran was always a tactical partner, not a strategic one. Russia’s refusal to veto UN sanctions for two decades and its reported intelligence coordination with Israel in Syria both illustrate this reality.

According to several former IRGC commanders, Israeli airstrikes in Syria were often facilitated by Russian intelligence. More recently, Mohammad Sadr, a member of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council, alleged that Russia even shared intelligence with Israel during the 12-day war. In this light, Iran’s failure to develop a nuclear weapon was never about fear of Western retaliation—it was about Moscow’s red lines.

Therefore, if Iran does not possess a nuclear bomb and its nuclear sites have already been destroyed, what then motivates Tel Aviv’s renewed aggression?

The answer lies in identity, deterrence, and hegemony. For decades, Israel and the Islamic Republic have defined each other as an “existential threat“. Their rivalry transcends conventional deterrence and has evolved into what might be described as omni-balancing—a state of perpetual confrontation across political, ideological, and military dimensions.

The latest Israeli attack targeted missile launchers, air bases, and conventional military infrastructure, not nuclear facilities. However, even this explanation is incomplete. Israel also struck non-threatening targets—including Red Crescent helicopters and helicopters used against border insurgents, basic training camps, and oil refineries. This suggests that Israel’s objective extended far beyond self-defence. This pattern indicates that Israel’s true concern lies with Iran’s growing missile capabilities and its potential to project power (hegemony) across the region.