Op-ed: Mutual Defence Pact – A strategic continuation of the Abraham Accords

When Riyadh and Islamabad pledged mutual defence, the Middle East quietly entered a new era of deterrence. It represented a deeper recalibration of regional security ties in the post-Abraham Accords Middle East — one that extends beyond religious affinity or historical partnership. The agreement signals the rise of a new layer of deterrence politics in the Muslim world, shaped as much by shifting great-power alignments as by regional rivalries.

Historically, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have maintained a long-standing relationship centred on security cooperation and mutual strategic interests. Their collaboration dates back to 1951, when the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship. In 1967, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000 Saudi military personnel, and a similar accord was concluded in 1982 to enhance Saudi defence capabilities.

The Mutual Defence Pact of September 2025 thus represents not an isolated event, but a continuation of a historical defence partnership that has evolved amid shifting regional and global dynamics. While this pact marks Pakistan’s second major defence agreement after the Cold War–era CENTO alliance, its objectives and strategic implications merit closer examination. Specifically, the pact can be interpreted less as a manifestation of Arab distrust toward the United States and more as an extension of a U.S.-aligned security architecture modelled on the Abraham Accords.

Unlike Pakistan’s broad but informal defence ties with China, this agreement is its first formal mutual defence treaty with another state. The core clause — “an attack on either country shall be considered an attack on both” — introduces complex geopolitical calculations. It implicitly positions Saudi Arabia within Pakistan’s adversarial dynamics, particularly vis-à-vis India and the Taliban.

Such entanglement raises critical questions: Would Riyadh be compelled to support Islamabad in the event of cross-border conflict with the Taliban? Could this commitment strain Saudi Arabia’s parallel economic and political relationships with India? Saudi-Indian trade relations, which exceed $42 billion annually, far outweigh Riyadh’s modest $5 billion trade volume with Pakistan. These asymmetries suggest that Riyadh’s participation in the pact is guided by strategic calculation rather than ideological alignment.

Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia’s primary motivation for joining the pact is deterrence—particularly against potential Israeli aggression. Indian officials have stated that Riyadh had informed New Delhi before the pact’s announcement, signalling a desire to manage any diplomatic fallout. However, such consultations may not prevent India from strengthening its own defence collaboration with Israel, especially amid regional uncertainty following the collapse of the Abraham Accords framework.

The most prominent narrative emerging from this defence agreement is the purported Arab loss of confidence in U.S. security guarantees. Nevertheless, this interpretation oversimplifies the situation. For instance, Qatar continues to host U.S. military forces and remains a key partner under Washington’s defence umbrella.

On October 1st, 2025, President Donald Trump reportedly issued an executive order reaffirming America’s commitment to Qatar’s security—underscoring that U.S. engagement in the Persian Gulf remains robust. Thus, the Pakistan–Saudi pact should not be viewed as a rejection of U.S. influence, but rather as a strategic instrument consistent with U.S. objectives: stabilising the Middle East while minimising direct American intervention.

From a structural realist perspective, this pact serves to balance U.S. alliances and reduce Washington’s strategic ambiguity in cases of tension between its partners, Saudi Arabia and Israel. By formalising cooperation between Pakistan and Riyadh, the United States indirectly ensures that regional deterrence mechanisms function without its immediate military involvement. Consequently, the pact contributes to cost reduction and the diffusion of security responsibilities among allied states—a key goal of U.S. grand strategy since the late 2010s. In fact, this is a kind of “security burden transfer” from the United States.

It is also improbable that this agreement was concluded without U.S. consultation. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia remain economically and politically dependent on Washington, and neither state possesses sufficient autonomy to undertake a major regional defence initiative independently. The Mutual Defence Pact can thus be interpreted as an extension of the Abraham Accords, conceived to maintain stability and order in the Middle East through indirect U.S. influence.

Much like the Nixon–Kissinger “two-pillar policy” of the 1970s, the Abraham Accords sought to position Saudi Arabia and Israel as twin anchors of regional stability. Following the deterioration of that framework after the events of October 7th and the resurgence of conflict involving Israel, Washington appears to have sought a revised mechanism for deterrence—this time incorporating Pakistan as a stabilising actor through its nuclear capabilities and military experience. The logic is clear: the United States needs stability in the Middle East to focus on East Asia and contain China.

For Iran, the agreement also functions as a deterrent toward Iran and its regional allies, particularly the Houthis in Yemen. The pact may be perceived as part of a broader encirclement dynamic. Although Saudi–Iranian relations have thawed under Chinese mediation, mutual mistrust remains deep. A Pakistan–Saudi defence understanding could be seen in Tehran as an attempt to institutionalise Sunni security cooperation, potentially reviving old anxieties about sectarian containment.

However, discussions within Pakistan about the potential emergence of an “Islamic NATO” reflect broader aspirations for collective defence among Muslim-majority nations. However, such ambitions are unrealistic and face significant limitations: Pakistan lacks the economic and logistical capacity to lead a multilateral alliance, and Washington is unlikely to endorse an independent Islamic defence bloc outside its strategic oversight. Ultimately, both Riyadh and Islamabad remain tied to U.S. geopolitical priorities.

From a broader geopolitical standpoint, the pact reflects a shared interest among global powers—notably the United States and China—in maintaining stability across the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Despite their intensifying rivalry, both Beijing and Washington benefit from uninterrupted energy flows and regional predictability. Yet, as their competition assumes a more confrontational tone, regional states will find it increasingly difficult to craft autonomous foreign policies. Consequently, while the Pakistan–Saudi pact enhances short-term deterrence, it may also deepen regional dependency on extra-regional powers.

In conclusion, the Saudi–Pakistan defence pact is both a reflection and a catalyst of the Middle East’s evolving security landscape. It extends the pragmatic spirit of the Abraham Accords into the broader Islamic world, blending diplomacy with deterrence. In any case, this pact is the first step towards shifting the centre of gravity of deterrence from Tel Aviv to Riyadh.

Whether it becomes a stabilising force or a source of new rivalries will depend on how transparently both states manage their cooperation. While the pact may temporarily stabilise the Middle East, its long-term sustainability will depend on whether regional actors can transcend their dependence on great-power patronage and develop genuinely independent security architectures.

Written by: Behrouz Ayaz

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