Op-ed: The quiet confrontation between Washington and Moscow — From Ukraine to Iran
The U.S. decision to postpone the delivery of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine is more than a logistical delay; it signals a return of the “classic logic of containment” in great power politics. This move reflects an unwritten understanding between Washington and Moscow.
While officially justified as a measure to prevent direct escalation, its implications extend beyond Europe, reaching the Persian Gulf and, particularly, Iran, where Tehran closely monitors the moves of global powers. It appears that the United States is delineating red lines that, beyond the Ukrainian theatre, send clear messages for constraining power in the Middle East. But why has Washington postponed the delivery of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine?
The roots of Washington’s considerations can be traced to developments concerning Iran. On October 16, Ali Larijani, the newly appointed head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, delivered a letter from Ali Khamenei to Putin. According to interpretations of its content, the letter requested Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 missile defence systems. Tehran views these acquisitions as critical for maintaining deterrence against Israel. Here, Israel enters the equation, and Putin, leveraging these military tools, was able to influence Washington’s decision regarding the Tomahawk shipment to Ukraine.
The United States also seeks, by limiting Ukraine’s access to specific weapons, to signal red lines to Russia and demonstrate that it still possesses the will and capacity for containment, while simultaneously avoiding direct engagement in the conflict. In effect, Washington’s withholding of Tomahawks exemplifies “strategic restraint” as a tool of pressure, showing that deliberate self-restraint can be as potent as military force. This reflects the unwritten rules of great power politics: maintaining leverage without crossing the threshold of direct confrontation. It is this subtlety that reproduces the fragile balance of the Cold War in a contemporary form.
Meanwhile, Iran finds itself in a dual position: on one hand, pursuing enhanced deterrence through S-400 systems and Su-35 fighters against Israel; on the other, ensnared in Moscow’s calculations, perhaps more so than over the past three decades. It is reasonable to link Iran’s inability to acquire nuclear weapons to Kremlin considerations in regional geopolitics and its firm opposition in this regard. Russia’s delay in delivering these systems and its resistance to Iran’s nuclear program are neither legal nor technical; rather, they are signs of “active control” over a weaker partner. Moscow, like Washington, employs the policy of containment through cooperation, keeping its partner hopeful while withholding full capabilities.
For years, Russia has sought to maintain Iran as a limited, tactical partner to leverage against the West, especially the United States, preventing it from developing fully independent capabilities. Similarly, U.S. behaviour in Ukraine demonstrates a shared pattern of indirect power projection. Putin skillfully exploits the tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran, for example, keeping Iran dependent on promised advanced equipment while pursuing its own military operations in Ukraine under the cover of regional tensions, selling its oil and gas at higher price, and portraying Iran as a potentially dangerous actor to extract concessions from the West through diplomatic leverage.
Regarding Tehran’s request for advanced military hardware, it seems Putin, through Netanyahu, was able to dissuade Trump from sending advanced weapons to Ukraine. His message is clear: any delivery of advanced weapons to Ukraine would remove his need to withhold Su-35s and S-400s to Tehran. In this way, Ukraine’s independence is constrained through war, and Iran’s through “calculated control.”
It is evident that, in international relations, the “operational independence” of medium and small regional powers is limited in the face of great powers. Iran and Ukraine, even when appearing to act independently, remain confined within the choices allowed by global powers. Secondary powers serve as instruments of mutual containment.
In conclusion, developments in Ukraine and Iran, and decisions by Washington and Moscow, demonstrate that crisis management has replaced crisis resolution. Great powers, through calculated control, contain direct escalation to their advantage, but this containment comes at the cost of pressure and dependency on smaller states.
The U.S. withholding Tomahawks from Kyiv and Russia’s delay in arming Iran represent two sides of the same reality. In the 21st century, power lies not in striking, but in deliberate restraint. Ukraine and Iran today are both victims and reflections of a political reality in which the independence of states is measured not by their own power, but by the degree of autonomy granted by great powers. In such a world, red lines are drawn not on maps, but in the minds of major actors — where strategic restraint is more meaningful than war itself.
Written by: Behrouz Ayaz
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