Op-ed: The quiet confrontation between Washington and Moscow — From Ukraine to Iran

The U.S. decision to postpone the delivery of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine is more than a logistical delay; it signals a return of the “classic logic of containment” in great power politics. This move reflects an unwritten understanding between Washington and Moscow.

While officially justified as a measure to prevent direct escalation, its implications extend beyond Europe, reaching the Persian Gulf and, particularly, Iran, where Tehran closely monitors the moves of global powers. It appears that the United States is delineating red lines that, beyond the Ukrainian theatre, send clear messages for constraining power in the Middle East. But why has Washington postponed the delivery of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine?

The roots of Washington’s considerations can be traced to developments concerning Iran. On October 16, Ali Larijani, the newly appointed head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, delivered a letter from Ali Khamenei to Putin. According to interpretations of its content, the letter requested Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 missile defence systems. Tehran views these acquisitions as critical for maintaining deterrence against Israel. Here, Israel enters the equation, and Putin, leveraging these military tools, was able to influence Washington’s decision regarding the Tomahawk shipment to Ukraine.

The United States also seeks, by limiting Ukraine’s access to specific weapons, to signal red lines to Russia and demonstrate that it still possesses the will and capacity for containment, while simultaneously avoiding direct engagement in the conflict. In effect, Washington’s withholding of Tomahawks exemplifies “strategic restraint” as a tool of pressure, showing that deliberate self-restraint can be as potent as military force. This reflects the unwritten rules of great power politics: maintaining leverage without crossing the threshold of direct confrontation. It is this subtlety that reproduces the fragile balance of the Cold War in a contemporary form.

Meanwhile, Iran finds itself in a dual position: on one hand, pursuing enhanced deterrence through S-400 systems and Su-35 fighters against Israel; on the other, ensnared in Moscow’s calculations, perhaps more so than over the past three decades. It is reasonable to link Iran’s inability to acquire nuclear weapons to Kremlin considerations in regional geopolitics and its firm opposition in this regard. Russia’s delay in delivering these systems and its resistance to Iran’s nuclear program are neither legal nor technical; rather, they are signs of “active control” over a weaker partner. Moscow, like Washington, employs the policy of containment through cooperation, keeping its partner hopeful while withholding full capabilities.