Trade Wars Hurt Consumers, Cooperation Doesn’t, say experts: interview

As economic tensions and regulatory fragmentation deepen between the United States and the European Union, finding constructive pathways for cooperation has become more urgent than ever.

A recent policy paper by the Consumer Choice Center addresses this challenge by offering pragmatic solutions aimed at strengthening transatlantic ties through innovation, consumer-friendly regulation, and mutual economic benefit. Rather than fueling a regulatory trade war, the paper advocates for policies that align incentives, promote digital innovation and enhance consumer welfare on both sides of the Atlantic.

To discuss the ideas behind the paper and the broader vision for EU–US cooperation, we spoke with three leading voices from the Consumer Choice Center. Yaël Ossowski, Deputy Director, brings years of experience in transatlantic policy and consumer advocacy. Eglė Markevičiūtė, Head of Digital & Innovation Policy and former Deputy Minister at the Lithuanian Ministry of Economy and Innovation, contributes deep insight from both the public and innovation sectors. Zoltán Kész, Government Affairs Manager and former Member of the Hungarian Parliament, adds a valuable perspective from the intersection of civil society and policymaking.

Together, they explore how smart, cooperative regulation can move beyond protectionism and toward shared prosperity.

The proposal calls for a consumer-focused approach related to U.S.-EU trade. How can the Trump administration balance domestic industrial reshoring with maintaining low prices and product variety for consumers, especially in the midst of a brutal tariff war?

Yaël Ossowski: Frankly, it’s uncertain how drastically increasing the cost of importing source materials and goods from abroad will do much more beyond raising prices for consumers. If the goal is to incentivize companies to reinvest in US factories, this is a long-term calculation done by private investors that must take a myriad of factors into account, including government policies, taxes, tariffs, labor, and much more. There are some voices in the administration that prefer targeted tariffs, which still lead to rising costs, but this would be much preferable to a blanket tax increase on 330 million Americans and the firms that serve them.

How should the US approach reshoring policies without sliding into protectionism or full decoupling from China, considering consumer costs and innovation?

Yaël Ossowski: Effective tax reforms and deregulation would go a long way to shore up American and foreign investors’ interests in bringing their operations to domestic US shores. The invisible tax on innovators that exists within the US regulatory system – think bureaucratic rules and prescriptions – should be reasonably scaled down so that consumers can gain more value from an environment that encourages innovation rather than just rudimentary compliance.

How can Europe deepen Atlantic supply chains without undermining the EU’s push for “strategic autonomy” in key industries?

Eglė Markevičiūtė: I’d like to focus on tech-related issues. Europe has long emphasized the importance of strategic autonomy in the digital domain. Recently, a more nuanced vision has emerged with the development of the Eurostack proposal—a plan to enhance Europe’s self-reliance in critical technological sectors. Crucially, the architects of Eurostack stress that “complete self-sufficiency is neither feasible nor desirable.” Instead, the initiative advocates for strengthening strategic capabilities while fostering beneficial international partnerships.

This reminds us that strategic autonomy doesn’t have to come at the expense of transatlantic cooperation. Strategic autonomy must be calculated and measured, guided by clear goals like expanding consumer choice and generating broader economic benefits—not driven by ideology. It’s essential to evaluate both the short- and long-term benefits of deeper digital collaboration with the U.S., especially when it comes to secure supply chains, shared innovation, and regulatory alignment.

Lastly, although regulatory alignment may seem impossible at this particular point in time, both the EU and the US would benefit from regulatory and standard alignment.

As for better US-EU alignment on digital rules, is there room for regulatory convergence, or are the philosophical differences too wide?

Eglė Markevičiūtė: Not necessarily. Take AI, for example. While President Biden’s original Executive Order on AI was revoked in January, the U.S. is currently preparing both an AI Action Plan and a new Executive Order. Questions on privacy, energy, and algorithms will have to be addressed. In this context, the EU’s experience—both positive and negative—with the AI Act could offer valuable insights for U.S. policymakers.

Regulatory convergence doesn’t mean one side must fully adopt the other’s approach. But open dialogue is essential. Despite criticism of the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC), I believe it should be revitalized—with both new and longstanding issues on the table. The potential for alignment, especially in fast-moving areas like AI, cybersecurity, and digital trade, is too important to ignore.

Given the paper’s concern about EU digital regulation and recent news from Brussels, what role should US tech companies play in advocating for regulatory interoperability with the EU?

Yaël Ossowski: U.S. tech companies are uniquely positioned to bridge the regulatory gap between Washington and Brussels. Operating on both sides of the Atlantic, they understand firsthand the practical challenges and implications of divergent digital rules. As such, they should play an active role in fostering regulatory interoperability—by sharing their experiences, proposing workable solutions, and encouraging constructive dialogue between regulators. Where possible, liberal democracies should establish streamlined trade agreements, if not data corridors, to remove the friction that comes with trying to store and deliver data across borders. 

If US-EU trade deepens under this proposal, what opportunities or risks are there for Central and Eastern European economies like Hungary?

Zoltán Kész: Before the US elections, Viktor Orban went all-in and put his bets on Trump’s victory and invested heavily in his reelection. Has it paid off? If we look at whether the country is benefiting from Trump’s trade wars, I doubt it. His high tariffs mean reducing exports to the US, hindering American investments in Hungary, and increasing uncertainty. Moreover, since the Hungarian economy heavily depends on the German automobile industry, many local factories will be hard hit. And, of course, prices will increase, especially for cars and technological imports.

The Consumer Choice Center proposal offers many benefits to Hungary and Central and Eastern Europe. We could have better access to the American markets (cars, medicines, IT), imports would be cheaper (for example, American technologies and agricultural products), Hungarian companies could take part in the global supply chains, and definitely, there could be a wider choice, lower prices, and better services. There is one other thing the present government might not favor for political reasons: not depending on China since Orban is interested in deepening Hungarian-Chinese relations. 

How can Hungary benefit from a US-EU partnership that aims to reduce reliance on Russian energy, without increasing domestic costs?

Zoltán Kész: Well, we know very well that for Orban, dependence on Russian gas is a political decision, not an economic one. There are speculations on how the Hungarian Prime Minister and his circles are financially interested in maintaining the country’s dependence on Russian gas. Looking at this objectively, the country would definitely benefit from the proposal. Diversification in this field would mean lower prices and less dependence on Russia. Hungary would not be solely dependent on Russian gas if there were cooperation between the EU and the US in LNG, renewables, and nuclear energy.

Hungary can only benefit from Transatlantic energy sector relations if EU-US cooperation relies on free markets, technological innovation, and real competition, not political protectionism. 

How can the US collaborate with allies better, especially in the EU, to reduce dependency on China for rare earth elements, and still maintaining competitive pricing?

Yaël Ossowski: Our paper outlines the areas of energy, mineral development, and defense as not only the most pressing but also the most lucrative for firms and consumers on both sides of the ocean. The truth is that liberal democracies in North America and Europe have much more in common than geopolitical foes in China or Russia. Scaling up LNG infrastructure to deliver and receive energy, as well as opening up mineral agreements and strong defense collaboration with industry partners would continue to create the freest and most prosperous trading bloc in the world. If our governments can commit to this, then all citizens and consumers can benefit and provide a model for the world.

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