MOGADISHU — The militant group al-Shabaab has successfully reclaimed several regions across Somalia in recent months, capitalising on escalating political and military friction in Mogadishu.

The resurgence comes amid bitter disputes between Somalia’s federal states over the national electoral system. The political crisis reached a boiling point following an announcement extending President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term by an additional year, despite his constitutional mandate having expired in mid-May.

According to a recent analysis by the International Crisis Group (ICG), two decades of volatile military and security shifts have left the Mohamud administration unable to neutralise the insurgent threat. The think-tank attributes this to “growing political fragmentation within the country,” which, coupled with a steady decline in foreign aid, has fueled fears that al-Shabaab could eventually threaten the central government itself.

“The war in Somalia has reached a stalemate with no end in sight,” the ICG report noted, adding that breaking the deadlock will not be easy. However, it suggested the government could learn from recent years by laying the groundwork for improved military performance and initiating negotiations that could lead to a political settlement with the insurgents. While a bitter pill for many to swallow, the ICG argues this remains “the only realistic way to end this exhausting war.”

A state of gridlock

The ICG highlights that the jihadist group made significant territorial gains in 2025. For the past two years, the Mohamud government has attempted to reorganise its forces to secure the perimeter around Mogadishu. Despite this, vast swathes of central Somalia remain firmly under militant control, creating a deadlock where neither side can achieve a decisive victory.

Amid these military struggles, controversial reports have emerged suggesting that Mogadishu has permitted foreign countries to train Somali soldiers on local soil using foreign mercenaries. According to these reports, the troops are intended to be deployed to Port Sudan to fight alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces and their Islamist allies, sparking fears of a destabilising domestic backlash within Somalia.

• Media reports: The media platform Darajiz reported on X (formerly Twitter) that more than 5,000 recruits are being trained in a Somali government camp ahead of their deployment to Sudan to counter the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Military and media sources cited by the platform claim the training program spans nine months and involves foreign contractors allegedly brought in from Romania, South Africa, and Colombia. The recruits reportedly include around 2,000 fighters from the northeastern region of Puntland, with the programme funded directly by Riyadh.

Shifting strategies

As the administration in Mogadishu faces scrutiny over external entanglements, the ICG warns that al-Shabaab has effectively adapted its strategy. The group has focused on improving relations with local populations in areas under its control, reducing its reliance on coercion—a tactical shift that has helped entrench its authority while the government grapples with infighting and dwindling international aid.

“Political solutions remain the most viable exit ramp from the insurgency.” — International Crisis Group

The ICG has urged Mogadishu to overhaul its military training framework, give federal member states a greater role in counter-insurgency planning, and alleviate civilian suffering by encouraging humanitarian agencies to deliver aid into al-Shabaab-controlled territories.

The think-tank described the shifting balance of power as a defining feature of Somalia’s long conflict, which has historically ebbed and flowed with little prospect of a purely military resolution. To improve its position—particularly as the African Union prepares to wind down its final support mission—the government must enhance recruit training and bolster its military capabilities.

However, observers note that the Mohamud government appears to be doubling down on militarisation at the expense of public services. This runs counter to the advice of the ICG, which advocates for non-military approaches, including the facilitation of humanitarian aid in insurgent-held zones.

The political and economic distractions in Mogadishu allowed al-Shabaab to reorganise and launch a fresh offensive in February 2025. By replacing key commanders, striking non-aggression pacts with local militias it fought in 2022–2023, and assuring central Somali residents they would not face retribution, the group successfully recaptured most of the Middle Shabelle and Hiran regions in the first half of 2025.

The ICG concludes that al-Shabaab’s recent advances have effectively redrawn the map of territorial control back to where it stood in 2022, reigniting deep anxieties among Mogadishu’s international partners over the government’s long-term capacity to contain the insurgency.

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