Hungary’s change of government is increasingly being felt inside the country’s national security apparatus. After the replacement of four intelligence chiefs in June, a new report suggests that the overhaul of the Hungarian intelligence services is reaching deeper into the organisations, including middle-ranking personnel and officers serving abroad. The developments come against the background of years of controversy over political control, surveillance and Hungary’s handling of Russian intelligence activity.

How the Hungarian intelligence services are structured

Hungary has five official national security services, according to the country’s National Security Services Act. The Információs Hivatal (IH) is the civilian foreign intelligence agency, while the Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal (AH) is primarily responsible for domestic counter-intelligence and identifying foreign intelligence operations.

The Katonai Nemzetbiztonsági Szolgálat (KNBSZ) handles military intelligence and counter-intelligence, while the Nemzetbiztonsági Szakszolgálat (NBSZ) provides specialist technical capabilities used in secret information-gathering. The fifth service, the Nemzeti Információs Központ (NIK), functions primarily as an intelligence fusion and analysis body.

For foreign readers, the system can therefore broadly be understood as a division between foreign intelligence, domestic counter-intelligence, military intelligence, technical surveillance support and central intelligence analysis.

Centralisation and controversies under Orbán

Under Viktor Orbán’s governments, control over the civilian intelligence system became increasingly centralised. After the 2022 election, several services were moved under the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office, headed by Antal Rogán, while the NIK was established to bring together intelligence gathered by different agencies.

An investigation by Direkt36 described this process as a major centralisation of the intelligence apparatus around the prime minister’s political centre.

The period was also marked by the Pegasus spyware scandal. In 2021, the international Pegasus Project found more than 300 Hungarian telephone numbers on a leaked list of possible surveillance targets. Amnesty International said forensic examinations confirmed that Pegasus had successfully infected several devices. Those identified as potential targets included journalists, lawyers, businesspeople and political figures.

Later that year, senior Fidesz politician Lajos Kósa publicly acknowledged that the Hungarian state had acquired Pegasus. He maintained that authorities had used surveillance tools legally and with the necessary authorisations, as Telex reported at the time.

Questions were also raised over the authorities’ response to Russian intelligence operations. According to a 2026 investigation by VSquare, Hungarian counter-intelligence recommended the expulsion of Russian embassy official Artur Sushkov in February after identifying him as an intelligence officer operating under diplomatic cover. VSquare reported that the Orbán government did not approve the move before the April election. Sushkov ultimately left Hungary on 4 May, after the change of government.

If you missed it: Orbán’s Russia scandal continues? Fidesz party director’s son talks with Russian diplomat linked to secret services

Four intelligence chiefs removed within days

The clearest early indication of a large-scale restructuring came in June, when the heads of four major Hungarian intelligence services were removed.

Szabolcs Bárdos left the AH, Krisztián Oláh the IH, Csaba Kiss the NBSZ and Norbert Tajti the KNBSZ. The dismissals were formally published by the government and reported by several Hungarian outlets, including 24.hu.

Appointments and transfers followed. The Interior Ministry announced through Hungary’s national news agency MTI that Zsolt Antal Annus would move from the NIK to head the AH, while Szabolcs Tóth was transferred to lead the NBSZ.

The scale and timing of the dismissals suggested that the new government was pursuing a broader institutional restructuring rather than isolated changes at individual agencies.

Reorganisation reportedly reaches officers serving abroad

The latest indication that the changes are moving beyond senior management came on 21 September from specialist French publication Intelligence Online.

The publication describes what it calls a “radical restructuring” of the Hungarian intelligence apparatus, affecting both agency chiefs and middle-ranking personnel. Its headline also says the process has extended to officers posted abroad.

The full report is available only to subscribers, meaning publicly accessible information does not establish how many officers have been recalled, which agencies are most heavily affected or which foreign postings are involved.

The distinction is important. Personnel changes by themselves do not demonstrate wrongdoing by those removed. They do, however, indicate that the restructuring has moved beyond replacing a handful of directors.

Russia provides another sign of a changed security approach

The internal overhaul has coincided with a notably tougher public response to suspected Russian intelligence activity.

On 8 September, Hungary ordered ten members of Russia’s diplomatic mission to leave the country, saying they had engaged in activities incompatible with diplomatic status. According to Helló Magyar, Foreign Minister Anita Orbán stressed the move did not amount to breaking diplomatic relations with Moscow, while Russia condemned the expulsions and promised retaliation.

Taken together, the replacement of intelligence chiefs, subsequent personnel changes, the reported reshuffling of officers stationed abroad and the tougher approach towards Russian intelligence activity point to a substantial reorganisation of the Hungarian intelligence services.

The longer-term significance will depend on whether the personnel overhaul is followed by changes in institutional oversight, operating practices and cooperation with Hungary’s NATO and EU partners.

As we wrote earlier, former PM Orbán’s anti-terrorism force chief suspect in Ukrainian ‘gold convoy’ case