Romania’s rising far-right AUR party is gaining political influence and reviving anti-Hungarian rhetoric, which raises concerns about the future of the country’s Hungarian minority. However, experts warn that the biggest danger of a potential AUR-led government might not be the immediate closure of Hungarian schools or cultural institutions, but a more subtle strategy: bringing the Hungarian minority’s political representatives under its control.

The Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), led by George Simion, has emerged as Romania’s largest opposition force. After joining forces with the Social Democrats (PSD) to bring down the Bolojan government, the party has gained influential positions in parliament, the Court of Accounts and the public media leadership.

Although AUR presents itself as an anti-establishment movement, its growing cooperation with the PSD suggests it is increasingly interested in becoming part of the political system. Simion is reportedly preparing for the 2028 elections, hoping to secure a place in government.

In an analysis published by Telex, journalist Péter Cseke and sociologist Tamás Kiss of the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities examined the party’s ambitions, its similarities with Viktor Orbán’s former political model and the implications for Transylvanian Hungarians.

Why is AUR becoming so popular?

According to Cseke, AUR’s greatest appeal is its anti-establishment message rather than its nationalist provocations. The party uses slogans such as “God, homeland, family, freedom”, presenting itself as an alternative to the political elite that has dominated Romania for decades.

Kiss identified two major factors behind its rise: the ultraconservative movement that developed around Romania’s 2018 family referendum, which helped build connections between the party and the Orthodox Church, and the social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the crisis, many people working in insecure jobs and Romanians employed in Western Europe felt abandoned by the state. AUR successfully channelled their frustration, distrust of institutions and opposition to vaccination.

The experts also see similarities between AUR’s political strategy and the model Viktor Orbán built in Hungary after 2010. Its economic programme combines tax cuts and deregulation with economic nationalism and demands for greater state control over strategic industries.

Kiss described this approach as a form of authoritarian neoliberalism. Like Fidesz, AUR seeks to strengthen domestic business interests against foreign capital. However, this could leave the very people who support the party economically vulnerable, as keeping domestic businesses competitive may depend on low wages and weak worker protections.

Anti-Hungarian rhetoric could give the struggling RMDSZ a lifeline

AUR has recently intensified its attacks on the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ), including proposals to abolish the alternative electoral threshold that helps the Hungarian party enter parliament. Another controversy involved an initiative to change the Romanian spelling of the Transylvanian resort name Băile Balvanyos.

Paradoxically, these attacks could benefit the RMDSZ politically.

The Hungarian party has faced difficulties following its unpopular participation in government and the electoral defeat of its main political ally in Budapest, Viktor Orbán. With Orbán no longer in power, AUR also has fewer reasons to moderate its rhetoric out of consideration for Hungary’s government.

Cseke believes the renewed nationalist attacks are breathing political life into the RMDSZ, which can use fears about the future of Hungarian minority rights to mobilise its voters ahead of the 2028 elections.

An AUR government might not close Hungarian schools – but the real danger could be greater

The experts agree that an AUR-led government would pose serious risks to Romania’s democratic institutions and its Hungarian minority. However, Kiss cautioned against assuming that the party would immediately launch an all-out assault on Hungarian schools, cultural organisations and minority representation.

He identified two separate dangers. The first would be the erosion of democratic checks and balances and the establishment of a more authoritarian political system. This would be particularly damaging for national minorities, whose rights depend heavily on democratic safeguards.

The second, more unexpected scenario concerns the future of the RMDSZ itself.

Rather than dismantling Hungarian institutions, an AUR government could seek to incorporate the Hungarian political elite into its own power structure, offering positions and financial support in exchange for political loyalty.

Kiss compared this potential strategy to Serbia under President Aleksandar Vučić, where the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ) has retained its institutional presence while becoming integrated into the governing system through political patronage.

In this scenario, the RMDSZ could remain in place, but gradually lose its independence and become a partner serving an increasingly authoritarian government.

Therefore, the most troubling possibility is not necessarily that Hungarian institutions would disappear, but that they could survive in name while losing their ability to represent the community independently.