President Vladimir Putin’s ruling United Russia party has strengthened its grip on parliament in the Russia election 2026, securing nearly 58% of the vote and remaining on course for a constitutional majority in the State Duma. For Hungary, the result does not immediately change bilateral relations, but it reinforces an important reality: Budapest will continue dealing with a politically entrenched Kremlin just as the new Hungarian government is moving closer to mainstream EU and NATO positions and redefining its relationship with Moscow.
According to preliminary results reported by Anadolu, United Russia received 57.83% of the vote, up from 49.82% in the 2021 parliamentary election, after 95.18% of ballots had been processed. Central Election Commission chief Ella Pamfilova said the party was also leading in 208 of the 225 single-member constituencies and was likely to secure 355 of the State Duma’s 450 seats.
The Communist Party received 13.81%, followed by the LDPR with 8.98% and New People with 7.96%, according to the preliminary figures. A Just Russia stood at 4.96%, just below the 5% threshold for entering parliament through the party-list vote.
The three-day election was Russia’s first parliamentary vote since 2022 and took place while the war in Ukraine continues.
Russia election 2026 reinforces political continuity in Moscow
The result points primarily towards continuity rather than a major change in Russian foreign or economic policy.
That is particularly relevant for Hungary. Since Péter Magyar replaced Viktor Orbán as prime minister following the April election, Budapest has begun recalibrating a relationship with Moscow that had become unusually close by EU standards.
In early September, Hungary expelled ten Russian diplomats for activities deemed incompatible with their diplomatic status. Foreign Minister Anita Orbán stressed that Budapest was not cutting diplomatic ties with Moscow, but said the decision was necessary to protect Hungary’s security and sovereignty, Anadolu reported.
The Russian election result therefore leaves Budapest facing a familiar counterpart: Putin remains president, United Russia continues to dominate parliament, and Moscow’s political direction shows little sign of changing as a consequence of the vote.
At the same time, the election took place in conditions that make its results difficult to interpret simply as a measure of unrestricted political competition. The Yabloko party was not included on the federal party-list ballot, although some of its candidates were able to contest individual constituencies. More than 111 million people were eligible to vote, with turnout reported at 59.32%, according to the election commission figures cited by Anadolu.
If you missed it: Budapest and Kyiv face sharp criticism from the Russian Embassy over alleged secrecy and unfulfilled promises
EU rejects Russian voting in occupied Ukraine
The European Union’s reaction is particularly important from a Hungarian perspective.
On Monday, the EU rejected Russia’s parliamentary voting conducted in Ukrainian territories under Russian occupation and warned that people involved could face sanctions.
According to Anadolu, the EU condemned what it called “so-called elections” in annexed Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as occupied parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. The bloc said the votes violated international law and Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The EU said it would “never recognise” either the holding of the votes in those territories or their results. It also warned that individuals involved in organising the elections there, as well as people deemed responsible for undermining free and fair elections inside Russia, could be targeted with sanctions.
The bloc also criticised Moscow for restricting political competition, excluding opposition forces and failing to invite observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
For Hungary, this position is more significant than it would have been under the previous government.
Budapest has recently moved closer to the foreign-policy positions of its EU and NATO partners. In a joint declaration issued on 14 September, Hungarian Foreign Minister Anita Orbán and German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stated that the two countries continued to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They also reaffirmed their commitment to a rules-based international order and closer cooperation within the EU and NATO.
That does not automatically mean Budapest will adopt every element of Brussels’ Russia policy. However, the new Hungarian government’s publicly stated position on Ukrainian territorial integrity places it considerably closer to the principles underpinning the EU’s rejection of Russia’s voting in occupied Ukrainian territory.
Energy remains Hungary’s biggest Russian connection
Diplomatic repositioning does not mean Hungary can quickly disentangle itself from Russia economically.
Energy remains the most important connection. The European Commission’s 2026 country report found that in 2025 more than 90% of Hungary’s imported oil and 74% of its imported gas originated in Russia. Hungary consequently remained one of the EU member states most dependent on Russian fossil fuels.
This dependence is increasingly at odds with the direction of EU energy policy.
The bloc has already dramatically reduced Russian fossil-fuel imports since 2022. Under the REPowerEU framework, Russian LNG imports are to be fully phased out by the end of 2026, while Russian pipeline gas imports are scheduled to end no later than 30 November 2027, according to the European Commission.
For Budapest, this means that future relations with Moscow will increasingly have to reconcile inherited Russian energy dependence with EU-wide diversification.
Paks II could become another major test
The other major Hungarian-Russian issue is nuclear energy.
Hungary’s planned Paks II nuclear power plant, contracted to Russia’s state-owned Rosatom, remains one of the largest economic links between the two countries. The EUR 12.5 billion project involves two Russian-designed VVER reactors and has suffered years of delays.
Prime Minister Péter Magyar has called for a review of the project, citing its costs and environmental issues surrounding the use of the Danube for cooling. Rosatom said in September that it was ready to discuss the project with the new Hungarian government, but had not yet received concrete proposals, Reuters reported.
The parliamentary election is unlikely on its own to alter Moscow’s position on Paks II. The more important question is how far the new Hungarian government wants to revise an agreement inherited from the Orbán administration. As we wrote earlier, Paks II could be delayed until 2035 as Rosatom schedule reveals setback.
What does the Russian result mean for Hungary?
For Hungary, the most relevant feature of the Russia election 2026 is the contrast between continuity in Moscow and change in Budapest.
United Russia’s strengthened majority gives little indication that Russia’s approach towards Ukraine, Western sanctions or relations with Europe will shift as a result of the election. The EU, meanwhile, has responded by explicitly rejecting the voting organised in occupied Ukrainian territories and signalling further sanctions against those involved.
Hungary now finds itself in a different position than during the later Orbán years. The Magyar government has reaffirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity, expelled Russian diplomats and sought closer cooperation with EU and NATO partners.
At the same time, the country remains heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas and is tied to Moscow through the multibillion-euro Paks II project.
The election therefore does not create a new Hungarian dilemma so much as underline an existing one: Budapest is moving closer to its Western allies politically while still having to manage some of the deepest Russian economic and energy ties within the European Union.
As we wrote earlier, Hungarian intelligence services undergo sweeping reorganisation after Orbán era
What happens after the Duma election? Russia expert Céline Marangé warns of the war spreading to Europe, a provoked *casus belli*—and a trap involving concessions.
In her incisive book *La guerre d’Europe a commencé* (The War in Europe Has Begun)—which reflects her deep knowledge of Russia—scholar Céline Marangé provides a precise analysis of the Putin regime’s “imperialist and revanchist motives.”
Question: Following the drone attacks on trains bound for Kyiv—very close to the Polish border—the question now arises: Is the war drawing ever closer? And why?
Céline Marangé: We are witnessing an extreme escalation here—both within Ukraine, with increasingly brutal attacks on the civilian population, and simultaneously against Europe, through a large number of indirect attacks. These attacks are intended to exert pressure on the Ukrainian government and European leadership. The brutality in Ukraine is becoming increasingly apparent, while actions against Europe are becoming ever more brazen and risky—potentially even leading to a *casus belli*.
The attack on the train just two kilometers from the border, along with the discovery of an armed drone at Leipzig Airport—in close proximity to a cargo plane loaded with weapons for Ukraine—demonstrate a willingness to escalate to the extreme. It all stems from the military and economic impasse in which the Russian government now finds itself.
For several months, the Ukrainians have been pursuing a strategy of “strategic neutralization,” having realized that a battlefield victory would be extremely difficult to achieve. Consequently, they are attempting to bring the war to Russian soil—intensifying attacks in the operational and strategic rear—to confront the Russian leadership with a strategic dilemma. The aim is to cut off the front line from supply lines, further weaken Russia’s already struggling economy, and damage President Putin’s standing.
Indeed, these frequent attacks are clearly causing a degree of unease within the highest echelons of Russian power. The Kremlin has promptly responded by launching an intensified offensive of its own. This demonstrates that while the Ukrainian strategy is effective, it is also highly risky, as the Russian army is now further stepping up its attacks in retaliation.
Question: Isn’t an escalation inevitable, given that both warring parties are playing a high-stakes game involving their very existence?
Marangé: After the parliamentary elections in Russia, we will see whether Putin actually engages in negotiations or opts instead for another round of mobilization. I lean toward the view that Putin has already reached a point of no return. For him, it is a matter of political survival and his place in Russian history.
If the war were to end, a reckoning would be inevitable—and it would hardly be a glorious one. He would then have to admit that his undertaking represents a massive failure, given the losses suffered, the meager successes, and the national interests—as defined prior to the invasion of Ukraine.
Question: That makes his motives all the more mysterious—and that is precisely what your book is about.
Marangé: My book aims to show that this regime seeks, on the one hand, to destroy the Ukrainian state in order to dominate Ukraine itself, and on the other, to exact symbolic and geopolitical revenge on Western nations by forcing a complete restructuring of Europe’s security architecture. We tend to downplay the radical nature of his intentions.
Putin is driven by both imperialism and revanchism; these two motives are, above all, evidence of his absolute lust for power—a deeply ingrained refusal to relinquish the position of power the Kremlin held during the Soviet era, when it dominated both the Soviet republics and the Warsaw Pact nations. The escalating brutality of Putin’s war is a consequence of pent-up frustration over a loss of power that he finds intolerable.
This brings me to a crucial point: the war in Ukraine is not a territorial conflict primarily concerned with the conquest of land. In fact, three goals are being pursued here simultaneously: The first is the disappearance of Ukraine as a sovereign entity—an objective sought through the weakening or even destruction of the Ukrainian state and the complete eradication of Ukrainian identity. This is evident in both words and deeds.
In the Russian-occupied territories, the Putin regime is currently pursuing a policy of aggressive Russification. The Ukrainian language has been banned, and all Ukrainian symbols have been removed from the public sphere. Above all, anyone perceived—rightly or wrongly—as a supporter of Ukraine is treated as a Nazi. Torture is commonplace.
The rhetoric is equally unambiguous. Vladimir Putin even denies the existence of a Ukrainian nation, claiming that Ukrainians are simply Russians who are unaware of the fact—Russians whose heads have been turned by the West, and who therefore need to be brought back onto the right path.
Unfortunately, Putin is not alone in this view. His prejudices regarding Ukraine are shared by many in Russian society and are also upheld by the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church continues to adhere to the concept of a tripartite Russian people, based on the idea of a “Great Russian nation” comprising three inseparable parts: Great Russians (Russians), Little Russians (Ukrainians), and White Russians (Belarusians).
Question: What is Russia’s second goal?
Marangé: Russia’s second goal is to weaken Europe by damaging NATO and the EU—the two institutions that have ensured European security for decades—and, if possible, even bringing about their dissolution. Another way to weaken Europe lies in the accelerated de-Westernization of the world as a whole, the undermining of the liberal world order, and the attempt to build an alternative “multipolar” order organized around what Putin’s ideologues term “civilizational states.” In this view, the “civilizational state” stands in contrast to the “nation-state.” It is their way of expressing the idea that former empires should enjoy special prerogatives within their immediate vicinity.
And finally, there is a third, particularly important goal: using the war to transform Russian society. Since 2022, we have seen a strengthening of autocracy, along with increased militarism, censorship, and self-censorship. Fear of arbitrary state action has returned, and culture is becoming increasingly militarized. Nearly 1.8 million children and young people belong to the “Youth Army” (Yunarmiya), where they receive military and ideological training.
Question: In your book, you also highlight typical Soviet methods.
Marangé: The Soviets relied primarily on coercion and subversion—tactics that remain crucial today, accompanied by propaganda, disinformation, and institutionalized lies, both domestically and abroad. Given past experience, a bit more caution is warranted here—especially now. Take, for instance, the Russian tactic of sham negotiations, which the Russian leadership uses to lull Europeans into a false sense of security.
We must not forget that we are dealing with Chekists trained in the school of the Soviet KGB. This means that negotiations are not always conducted in good faith. One can engage in negotiations without any guarantee of an outcome. However, one can also enter into negotiations without the slightest intention of actually reaching an agreement. Such negotiations can serve as a ruse, a distraction, or a stalling tactic designed solely to discredit the adversary in the eyes of their allies.
I believe that is precisely the kind of maneuver we are seeing from Putin right now. It is therefore fundamental that we revisit the question of Russia’s underlying intentions and actual objectives: if you believe this war is merely a territorial conflict, then you might propose territorial concessions—much like Donald Trump’s son-in-law and his golf partner have done.
However, if you recognize that the war aims to destroy the Ukrainian state and weaken Europe, you would reject any territorial sacrifices; such concessions would mean abandoning fortified defensive lines and key cities, thereby plunging Ukraine into even greater insecurity.
Question: So-called realists argue that concessions regarding Ukraine are necessary, claiming that this is how Europe can avoid war.
Marangé: Anyone who believes that overlooks the fact that appetite grows with eating—and that a militaristic regime thrives on war. It will be very difficult for the Putin regime to put an end to it. Moreover, there is objective evidence that the Russians are preparing for a potential expansion of the war into Europe—specifically regarding the enlargement of the army, with active troop numbers rising from 1.15 million to 1.5 million. Then there is the “Youth Army” we mentioned earlier. According to official sources, Russia also has around two million reservists—a pool that gives Putin the option to further reinforce his armed forces if necessary.
The second indicator relates to economic decisions. Defense and security spending currently officially accounts for 38 percent of the federal budget, though some estimate the actual figure to be as high as 44 percent. And that is without even considering Russia’s arms production capabilities, which are far more difficult to assess. According to NATO data, Russia is capable of producing several million drones and artillery shells, 2,000 ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and up to 300 tanks annually—whereas France, for instance, possesses a total of only 215 tanks for its entire army.
Question: As a society that tends to be risk-averse, are we not underestimating the fact that Putin is highly willing to take risks—as he has already demonstrated in Syria, Chechnya, and now in Ukraine?
Marangé: The personalization and concentration of power facilitate risky decisions. However, it is true that Putin has shown a strong preference for strategic surprises—such as the annexation of Crimea, the destabilization of the Donbas, his intervention in the Syrian civil war, and, of course, the invasion of Ukraine.
It is therefore appropriate to consider the possibility that the Russians might escalate matters further and prepare a provocation against Europe. A key point here is that they do not necessarily need a full-scale confrontation, especially since they currently lack the requisite means; while Russia’s army is battle-hardened, it is also weakened.
With at least 300,000 soldiers dead, at least 7,000 officers killed, and elite units decimated right at the start of the war, the army has lost capabilities that cannot be restored overnight. Nevertheless, the Russians could still achieve their goals—namely, demonstrating the futility of NATO’s Article 5 by staging a serious provocation to which NATO fails to respond decisively. If this were to lead to a US withdrawal, for instance, it would cause a deep rift in the Atlantic Alliance.
This interview first appeared in the French newspaper *Le Figaro*, which, like *WELT*, is a member of the Leading European Newspaper Alliance (LENA).
“Angela Merkel was the true extremist of our time,” writes a *Times* columnist.
The British journalist’s commentary states: “It was not merely a matter of her opening the door in 2015 to nearly a million unvetted, predominantly male asylum seekers; it was that she did so in full awareness of the consequences. We know this because, at the time of her (then widely celebrated) ‘We can do this’ speech, she had already pointed out many of these repercussions. She knew this would burden the German people with ruinous financial costs, yet she acted anyway, prioritizing the display of her own moral stance over the interests of her voters.”
Syed also speculates that Merkel knew the massive influx of people—Germany recorded around 1.92 million initial asylum applications between 2015 and 2021, according to the BAMF—would place enormous pressure on the native population. He argues that Merkel seemingly knowingly accepted heavy financial burdens for her country, additional strain on schools and the housing market, and tensions within Europe. Furthermore, he claims that Merkel’s policies contributed to a rise in certain types of crime; specifically, he cites rape and sexual assault, noting the events of New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne.
Criticism also directed at Merkel’s foreign and security policy
He further criticizes the tendency to label right-wing parties as “far-right,” “radical,” or “hard-right,” arguing that, in his view, the true extremism lies with established politicians who continue to champion open borders. The *Times* opinion piece states: “If extremism means acting disproportionately to context, history, or public consent, then Merkel’s tenure was the pinnacle of post-war European extremism.” In his view, the rise of the AfD and other right-wing parties is not the cause, but rather the consequence, of a generation of “hyper-liberal” politicians—the most prominent representative of whom was Angela Merkel. (The text also mentions politicians such as David Cameron, Boris Johnson, Justin Trudeau, François Hollande, Emmanuel Macron, and Ursula von der Leyen – Ed.)
The author also attacks Merkel’s foreign and security policies. He criticizes her for sticking with Nord Stream 2 despite Russia’s annexation of Crimea, for expanding ties with China, and for consistently failing to meet the NATO target of spending two percent of GDP on defense.
Matthew Syed concludes his critique with a damning verdict: Angela Merkel was, to quote, “arguably the worst modern Western leader” ever. He claims the CDU politician championed measures “she knew would harm people at the bottom of the social scale.”
The *Times* columnist then circles back to the beginning of his piece: “…though (of course) not those like (Jürgen) Klopp, who live in gated communities and whose closest contact with migrants consists of multi-millionaire footballers.” His conclusion: “The rise of these ‘new’ right-wing parties was fueled by the extremism of their predecessors—a generation of hyper-liberal leaders who had forgotten what they stood for and whom they were meant to serve.”
Source: Welt.de
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European security agencies are warning of a potential escalation by Russia, according to a report by *The Guardian*. Michal Koudelka, head of the Czech intelligence service BIS, told the British newspaper that action against NATO could occur “in months, not years.” He cited a limited military incursion, false-flag provocations, or a large-scale influence campaign as possible scenarios.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk had previously warned of potential drone or missile attacks on NATO territory. Russia might be seeking to test whether the alliance’s mutual defense obligation under Article 5 would actually take effect. French President Emmanuel Macron described the underlying intelligence as “sound and well-documented.”
Representatives from the Baltic states expressed more caution. Normunds Mežviets, head of Latvia’s security service, told *The Guardian* that there were currently no indications of an imminent attack. While Moscow’s preparations for more assertive action in Europe are evident, it remains unclear whether concrete attack plans exist or if Russia primarily aims to stoke fear and uncertainty in the West.
However, according to the report, the intelligence chiefs agree that Russia is likely to further intensify its sabotage and influence operations in Europe. Furthermore, Thomas Nilsson, head of Swedish military intelligence, sees no signs of serious Russian peace efforts regarding the war in Ukraine, describing the situation instead as Russian “negotiation theater.”
Source: Welt.de
Russia never tires of devising ways to recruit people for the bloody war it is waging in Ukraine. Through deception and promises of high pay in civilian professions (or, at the very least, in rear support services for the troops), it has managed to lure thousands of people from poor countries in Africa and Asia into the country and then send them to the front lines. A new twist in the recruitment campaign has been the offer to participate in a movie production.
The ad, designed in the style of an action movie poster, reads: “Global casting call. New film project. Seeking Africans for male roles.” This ad appeared on Facebook and featured an AI-generated image of Black men in military uniforms, according to Politico. The captions, whether intentionally or not, play on the word “shooting” (which in English can mean both “shooting” and “filming”).
The recruiters’ main target is young men who cannot find a steady job—or any job at all—and are unable to earn a decent living due to the dire economic situation in their home countries. The African nonprofit organization Code for Africa has identified 89 websites, seven accounts on Facebook and other social media platforms, and 39 accounts or channels on messaging apps used as part of the Russian operation, with new ones constantly emerging.
As a result, residents of India, Sri Lanka, Cuba, Kenya, Nepal, Botswana, South Africa, and other countries have been drawn into the war in Ukraine. Leaders of some of these countries—such as South Africa and Kenya—have even personally demanded that Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov put an end to this practice in their countries.
Moscow has created a massive propaganda machine with tens of thousands of bots, influencers, and content marketers tasked with crafting a compelling narrative for Africans in which Russia is portrayed as the defender of their freedom, sovereignty, and dignity, Will Brown /b>, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Politico:
At first, we thought this propaganda machine was only meant to influence public opinion. But now it’s clear that it’s also being used to recruit desperate young people to the front lines. [Those who end up there] report racial abuse, how their money is stolen and they are forced to sign contracts [with the Russian Ministry of Defense] whose terms they do not understand, and after a week of training, they are thrown into a minefield.
https://www.politico.eu/article/how-western-tech-helps-funnel-recruits-into-russias-war-africa/
Even though it might seem at first glance that this topic has nothing to do with the war in Ukraine, a closer look reveals that these actions are indeed connected to that context.
Unlike Trump, China is fully aware that this is not a limited regional conflict and is gearing up for the future.
China has sharply increased its gold purchases this year. In the first eight months, the country imported more than 1,000 metric tons of the precious metal, spending a record $158.8 billion on it. This is reported by the Financial Times.
By comparison, China imported 886 metric tons of gold worth $96.5 billion in all of 2025.
The main reason for this demand is the desire of the government and private investors to protect their savings amid geopolitical instability and weak returns on other assets.
Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds fell to $618 billion in July, the lowest level since August 2008. At the same time, attractive investment opportunities within the country have dwindled. The real estate market crisis has persisted since 2021, and the CSI 300 Index has lost 1.8% since the start of the year and is more than a fifth below its peak levels from early 2021. Yields on Chinese government bonds have also approached historic lows.
“Both the central bank and private investors are diversifying their reserves and savings toward an asset that carries no counterparty risk,” said Lisa Liu, managing director of Gold Mountains Asset Management .
Chinese demand for gold reflects not a short-term trend but a more sweeping restructuring of asset allocation. “This is a long-term restructuring of the asset allocation of households and the government,” Liu said.
At the same time, the actual volume of purchases by the People’s Bank of China may exceed official figures. Goldman Sachs estimates the central bank’s July purchases at 35 metric tons, compared to the reported 20 metric tons.
China itself is the world’s largest gold producer, but domestic production is clearly insufficient to meet current demand. Last year, the country produced 384 metric tons of gold.
https://www.ft.com/content/ed38995e-c7be-4703-9775-eb384a037ce3
Following the discovery of drone parts near the Bundeswehr airbase in Wunstorf, Lower Saxony, suspicious material was found during the subsequent search for evidence. According to security sources, the material consists of traces of explosives. It is reportedly still being investigated to what extent these traces can be linked to the drone.
Earlier, NDR, WDR, and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* had reported that investigators suspected the recovered drone might have been equipped with explosives. The suspicious material was reportedly found just a few meters away from the drone. The report added that forensic analysis of the substance had not yet been concluded.
When asked about the report, a spokesperson for the Interior Ministry in Hanover referred inquiries to the Federal Public Prosecutor General. A spokesperson for the latter authority in Karlsruhe declined to comment.
Last week, following the discovery of the drone, investigators searched the difficult-to-access terrain in the Hanover region. They believe the drone crashed there and broke apart into several pieces. The origin of the drone remains unclear. The Wunstorf airbase is located east of the area near Lake Steinhude (*Steinhuder Meer*); it is a key Bundeswehr site and home to the German A400M fleet.
https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article6ab2aaf66738b9433e6e287f/wunstorf-drohnenfund-in-niedersachsen-womoeglich-sprengstoff-in-der-naehe-entdeckt.html
Naturally, Russia will once again claim to have absolutely nothing to do with it.
The DHL logistics center in Leizen, Mecklenburg, has been evacuated due to a suspected hazardous substance. A police spokesperson stated that an employee had contacted the police to report symptoms possibly indicating mercury exposure. The substance was reportedly found on or inside a package.
Over the weekend, an apartment—also in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania—was evacuated following the discovery of mercury. Police reported that a resident had ordered flowers online and the hazardous substance was discovered within the delivery. According to the police, the presence of mercury was confirmed by specialized fire department units from Hamburg. Two female residents required medical treatment.
Source: Welt.de
A Russian propaganda organization used film crews to operate in European countries, passing them off as independent documentary filmmakers. Journalists from the Czech publication Seznam Zprávy exposed the propagandists’ activities in Prague, reports the Center for Countering Disinformation.
Russian propagandists, some of whom hold EU residence permits (in Germany), traveled to the Czech Republic posing as documentary filmmakers. They arranged interviews with local experts, journalists, and politicians. The material they gathered was intended to create the illusion of “objectivity” and promote the Kremlin’s narratives about the “decline of Europe.” After Seznam Zprávy journalists exposed the film crew’s true intentions right in the middle of the meeting, the propagandists tried to flee.
One of the organizers of Moscow’s disinformation operation turned out to be Boris Dvorkin, who is linked to a foundation headed by the director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Naryshkin. Similar filming took place or was planned not only in the Czech Republic, but also in Slovakia, Serbia, Austria, Hungary, Belgium, France, and other countries.
The Center for Political Analysis noted that, despite the sanctions, Russian influence agents are managing to find loopholes and continue their work in the EU. The situation requires heightened attention from the governments and law enforcement agencies of European countries, as well as from the public, since the spread of disinformation and the Kremlin’s hybrid influence pose a direct threat to the national security of EU member states.
This development is being viewed very critically and monitored closely by Germany’s neighbors, particularly Poland and France—countries that still vividly recall the consequences of the “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles” era.
Following the AfD’s major electoral successes in East Germany (the former GDR, with a population of approximately 16 million)—results that naturally cannot be compared to the situation in West Germany (the former Federal Republic, with over 64 million inhabitants)—Russia is keen to engage in dialogue with the party. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told the Russian news agency Interfax that the Alternative for Germany’s statements regarding a resumption of relations with Russia “impress us.”
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had already hosted AfD co-leader Tino Chrupalla for talks in the Russian capital back in 2020, and representatives of the party also attended the St. Petersburg Economic Forum this year, despite Russia’s war of aggression.
Kirill Dmitriev, the Kremlin official responsible for international economic cooperation, recently announced plans for another business forum involving AfD representatives to be held next year.
In the past, Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin has also spoken favorably about the AfD on several occasions. He offered to resume supplying relatively inexpensive Russian gas to Germany—contingent on the lifting of Western sanctions—provided there was a long-term agreement independent of the shifting political climate.