Many see András Baka becoming Hungary’s next president as a form of historical justice after his controversial removal. But does that make the removal of Sulyok any more democratic?
The similarities between the removal of András Baka in 2011 and that of Tamás Sulyok in 2026 are difficult to ignore. In both cases, a constitutional change was used to bring the mandate of an incumbent constitutional office-holder to an early end.
That makes Baka’s election as Hungary’s next president all the more intriguing. Many see it as historical justice after his controversial removal under the Orbán government. But it also raises a difficult question for Tisza: if Baka’s removal was an abuse of constitutional power, what makes Sulyok’s removal any different?
What happened to András Baka?
András Baka became President of Hungary’s Supreme Court in 2009. He publicly criticised several government reforms affecting the judiciary and warned that they threatened judicial independence.
His mandate was then terminated years before it was due to expire, as the constitutional framework of Hungary’s judiciary was fundamentally reorganised.
The case eventually reached the European Court of Human Rights. In 2016, the Court ruled that Hungary had violated Baka’s rights, finding that the premature termination of his mandate was linked to his public criticism of constitutional and legislative reforms concerning the judiciary.
The story therefore seems almost tailor-made for historical justice. The former chief justice who became one of the symbols of the Orbán era’s rule-of-law problems has now been elected president in the middle of a political transition whose central promise is to restore the rule of law. But this is exactly where the comparison becomes uncomfortable.
The resemblance is striking
Let us put the two cases next to each other and look at the constitutional mechanism itself. Baka’s mandate was brought to an early end by a constitutional provision stating:
The mandates of the President of the Supreme Court and the President and members of
the National Council of Justice shall be terminated when the Fundamental Law comes into force.
Sulyok’s mandate, meanwhile, is being terminated by another constitutional provision:
On the day following the entry into force of the Seventeenth Amendment to the
Fundamental Law, the mandate of the President of the Republic in office shall terminate.
The circumstances are certainly not identical. András Baka was the President of the Supreme Court, and his removal took place amid a fundamental restructuring of the judiciary. The European Court of Human Rights subsequently found a violation of his Convention rights.
Sulyok, by contrast, is being removed by a newly elected parliamentary majority that has the constitutional majority required to amend the Fundamental Law.
But the central question remains. Should a parliamentary majority be able to change the constitution specifically so that the mandate of an incumbent constitutional office-holder ends? If the answer was no when Orbán’s government did it, why should the answer automatically become yes when Tisza does it?
Was electing Baka a mistake?
Politically, probably not. Baka is an exceptionally powerful symbol for Tisza. His career allows the new government to present the presidency as part of a restoration of judicial independence and democratic institutions.
Fidesz, meanwhile, can hardly attack András Baka without reopening the uncomfortable question of why he was removed in the first place. In the short term, therefore, his election is a clever political move. In the longer term, however, Baka could become one of Tisza’s biggest constitutional headaches.
From now on, whenever the legality or legitimacy of Sulyok’s removal is debated, Baka’s name will inevitably be brought into the discussion. Critics can draw the parallel in a single sentence: In 2011, one government used constitutional change to remove an inconvenient constitutional figure. In 2026, another government did something remarkably similar.
Of course, Tisza can argue that it is dismantling a political and constitutional system built by Orbán and that it has received a democratic mandate to do so. But that is precisely where the rule-of-law test begins. Constitutional safeguards are not supposed to protect only the politicians we support. They are supposed to protect institutions even when the people in power are the ones we strongly disagree with.
And that is why Baka’s election is such a powerful — and potentially awkward — symbol. The former chief justice removed through constitutional engineering has returned as president. The question is whether Hungary has truly learned the lesson of his case. Or whether it has simply changed who gets to use the same constitutional tools.
But why did Tisza ultimately choose András Baka over Judit Polgár for the presidency? We explored the reasons in more detail in this article.
