The National Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office was one of Péter Magyar’s major election promises. But what will its real role be?
Only a few months ago, it was still an election promise. Now it exists in Hungarian law: the National Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office, or NVVH, has been formally established, with its own chapter added to the central budget in August. The process of selecting its leadership has also entered its final stage.
On Thursday, 27 August, the parliamentary Justice and Constitutional Affairs Committee nominated political scientist Anna Róza Unger as president of the new office and Katalin Tasnádi as deputy president responsible for investigative matters. Parliament is expected to decide on their appointments by secret ballot on Friday. If approved, the office could begin operating from 1 September.
The question, however, is becoming increasingly intriguing: is Hungary getting a new independent safeguard for the protection of public wealth, or is Péter Magyar’s government creating a powerful political cudgel?
The answer matters because NVVH is potentially one of the most powerful institutions created by the new government. It could become a formidable weapon against corruption. But precisely because of the breadth of its powers, it could also become one of the most sensitive institutions in Hungary’s new political system.
This is not simply another government office
NVVH was not created merely to become another state agency occupying a few floors of an office building in Budapest.
Under the new law, its purpose is to uncover unlawful management of public assets, protect public wealth and identify, secure and recover assets that have unlawfully left public ownership. Its remit can cover public procurement, subsidies, concessions, European Union funds, state and municipal assets, public-service financing and the financial flows surrounding state-owned companies.
The legislation goes considerably further than a conventional auditing body.
NVVH can conduct investigations into public-asset risks, order certain forms of asset protection, initiate proceedings before other authorities and bring civil actions. Most importantly, under the criminal procedure framework, it can conduct investigations and, in specified circumstances, exercise the powers of a public prosecutor, including bringing charges and representing the prosecution in court.
That makes the office something considerably more consequential than a traditional supervisory authority.
And it immediately raises the uncomfortable question: who watches the watchdog?
The “Péter Magyar’s political cudgel” accusation is not entirely baseless
The perennial problem with supposedly independent authorities is that independence on paper does not automatically guarantee independence in practice.
A great deal depends on who is appointed to lead the institution, how cases are selected, what safeguards apply to investigations and how effectively courts and other institutions can review its decisions.
This is why the selection of NVVH’s leadership has itself become a political and constitutional test.
The process has already attracted controversy. Ninety-six applications were reportedly submitted for the presidency, with the parliamentary committee initially selecting three leading candidates. The Tisza parliamentary group subsequently sought the hearing of Nicholas Sárvári as an additional candidate, describing him as a professionally suitable applicant who had received the fourth-highest score. Sárvári himself said he had learned from the press that the Tisza group had nominated him. The following day, the Tisza group clarified that none of the candidates was formally a party or parliamentary faction nominee.
Meanwhile, Fidesz members boycotted the selection process.
None of this proves that the office is politically controlled. But it does illustrate why the credibility of its independence will be tested from its very first day.
A rule-of-law safeguard or a political accountability machine?
Perhaps the most important question is therefore not what NVVH is called, but how it behaves.
The law goes out of its way to describe the institution as independent and subject exclusively to the law. It also explicitly requires it to operate according to the principles of legality, independence, objectivity, impartiality, proportionality and respect for fundamental rights.
On paper, these are significant safeguards.
If the office genuinely follows professional criteria, operates according to transparent procedures, gives reasons for its decisions and remains subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny, it could become one of the most important institutions of the government’s promised political transformation.
Its purpose would not simply be to punish decisions made by previous governments. Rather, it would create a permanent institutional mechanism for following public money: where it came from, where it went, who benefited from it and whether the process was lawful.
That could represent a major change in Hungary’s approach to public-sector corruption.
But the opposite scenario is equally easy to imagine.
An authority with extensive investigative powers, access to financial information and the ability to initiate criminal and civil proceedings could become a formidable instrument of political accountability — or political retaliation — if the institutional safeguards prove too weak.
Anti-corruption policy is credible only when the same rules apply to everyone.
If an alleged abuse committed by a former Fidesz government is treated as a serious matter, while a similar case involving the new governing party is quietly ignored, NVVH would quickly lose the very legitimacy it was created to establish.
The first appointments will matter enormously
The choice of Anna Róza Unger therefore carries significance beyond the appointment of another senior public official.
Unger, an associate professor at ELTE’s Faculty of Social Sciences, emerged from a field of candidates that included Transparency International Hungary legal director Miklós Ligeti and sociologist and corruption researcher Dávid Jancsics. Jancsics later withdrew his application.
The fact that Ligeti was among the leading candidates was particularly notable because he had publicly stressed the importance of keeping the institution independent and warned against turning it into a political “witch hunt”.
That distinction is crucial. There is nothing inherently undemocratic about establishing a powerful anti-corruption institution. In fact, an effective system for recovering stolen or unlawfully transferred public assets can strengthen the rule of law.
The danger begins when the political leadership of the country starts treating such an institution as an extension of its own political agenda.
So what will NVVH actually become?
The answer will not ultimately be found in the title of the law, but in the first major cases.
The Hungarian Parliament has already taken the formal steps needed to establish the office, including creating its own budgetary chapter. The legislation gives it an unusually broad mandate, covering everything from public procurement and EU funding to state assets, financial transactions and criminal proceedings.
Now comes the difficult part: proving that these powers can be used without becoming political weapons. For Péter Magyar and the Tisza government, this is an opportunity to demonstrate that asset recovery is not about revenge against the previous political establishment, but about building a functioning system in which public money is genuinely protected.
For the opposition, meanwhile, the test will be straightforward. Will NVVH investigate only the alleged abuses of the previous government? Or will it show the same determination if questionable decisions emerge on the government’s own side?
That is ultimately what will decide whether the new institution becomes a political cudgel or a genuine rule-of-law safeguard. Not what Péter Magyar says about it, not what Fidesz says about it, and not even what the legislation promises.
The real test will come when NVVH has to choose between protecting the government of the day and protecting the public purse. If it chooses the latter — regardless of who is in power — Hungary may indeed be entering a new era. If it does not, the grand promise of a new system may simply have produced another powerful political weapon.
