A company selling powerful digital forensic tools to law-enforcement agencies across Europe — including the Hungarian police — has been accused by US authorities of concealing its Russian ownership and the fact that its software was developed in Russia. The case has raised fresh questions over Russian surveillance software in Europe and the security of technologies used to access highly sensitive digital evidence.

As The Hungary Insider reported based on a POLITICO investigation, Virginia-based Oxygen Forensics worked with EU-backed projects and supplied technology to law-enforcement agencies across several European countries.

The company develops digital forensic software designed to extract, preserve and analyse information from electronic devices such as smartphones and computers. Such tools can be used by investigators to recover messages, photographs, location information and other data relevant to criminal investigations.

US prosecutors now allege, however, that Oxygen Forensics concealed significant aspects of who actually controlled the company and where its technology was developed.

Hungarian police bought Oxygen Forensics technology

Hungary is directly connected to the case.

According to a Hungarian government procurement document cited by POLITICO, Hungarian police signed an IT contract with Oxygen Forensics in December 2024 worth HUF 10.14 million (approximately EUR 26,000). The contract ran until December 2025.

Russian-linked tech reached Hungarian police
Photo: depositphotos.com

The Hungarian example is significant because Oxygen’s technology is not an ordinary office software package. Digital forensic systems are specifically designed to work with information extracted from computers and mobile devices during investigations.

POLITICO reported that Oxygen products have also been used or recognised by law-enforcement authorities elsewhere in Europe, including Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland.

The company’s presence extended to EU-backed initiatives as well. Public records reviewed by POLITICO show that Oxygen was involved with two projects aimed at improving the handling and analysis of electronic evidence in criminal investigations.

The European Commission told the publication that Oxygen was not a member of the project consortia and therefore did not receive Commission funding through them.

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Why Russian surveillance software in Europe raises security concerns

For foreign readers, the significance of the case lies largely in what digital forensic software is capable of doing.

Unlike conventional business applications, forensic tools can operate close to some of the most sensitive information handled by police and investigative authorities. Their purpose is precisely to extract and analyse data from devices, potentially including communications, photographs, documents and other evidence.

This means that the identity of a supplier’s owners, the location of its developers and control over its software-development environment can become important security considerations.

The US Department of Justice alleges that Oxygen Forensics presented itself to American government customers as an independent US-based company, while five Russian nationals actually owned and controlled it through a Cyprus-based holding company. Prosecutors also allege that the software was developed by a team working in Russia.

The same five people also owned a Russian company which, according to the US authorities, sold versions of the technology to customers reportedly including Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), Investigative Committee and Interior Ministry.

These allegations are particularly sensitive in Europe following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which fundamentally changed the EU’s security relationship with Moscow.

No allegation that the software contained malicious code

There is an important distinction in the case. The US criminal complaint does not allege that Oxygen’s software contained malicious code or that it was used to gain unauthorised access to customers’ computer systems or data, the US Department of Justice explicitly stated.

In other words, the current case should not be interpreted as evidence that Russian authorities obtained information from Hungarian police systems or from other European customers through Oxygen software.

The allegations instead concern the company’s ownership, control, development arrangements and representations made to government customers.

US authorities have charged Oxygen Forensics CEO Lee Reiber and Russian national Oleg Sergeyevich Davydov with conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Reiber was arrested in Idaho, while Davydov was detained at London’s Heathrow Airport, with the United States seeking his extradition. Both defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

A wider European supply-chain question

The affair nevertheless highlights a broader challenge for European governments: understanding who ultimately controls the technology used inside sensitive public institutions.

This is particularly important for Russian surveillance software in Europe, as software supply chains can involve developers, owners, cloud infrastructure and corporate structures spread across several jurisdictions.

For Hungary, the procurement identified by POLITICO now provides a concrete domestic dimension to what might otherwise appear to be a distant US criminal case.

The key unanswered questions include what exact systems Hungarian police used, what information those systems could access, and whether Hungarian authorities carried out any subsequent security review after concerns emerged about Oxygen Forensics’ Russian connections.

For now, the publicly known allegations do not establish that Hungarian data were compromised. They do, however, put the Hungarian procurement into a much wider debate over how European law-enforcement agencies vet the companies entrusted with technology designed to handle some of their most sensitive digital evidence.

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